The United States Response to Common Market
Trade Preferences and the Legality
of the Import Surcharge
Since 1934 the United States has attempted to maintain "mostfavored nation" treatment as an organizing principle for world trade.'
This principle, which requires that countries preserve a unitary external tariff for the same goods imported from different countries, has
been given legal status under domestic statutes2 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).3
Since the formation of the European Economic Community (ECC)
or Common Market in 1958, however, a major challenge has been
posed for the most-favored nation principle. The EEC has gone outside
the six original Common Market countries to conclude a number of
association agreements, generally with less-developed countries, in
which the parties set tariff levels on particular goods at a rate lower
4
than those set for the rest of the world.
This comment is organized into two principal parts. The first part
1 H. CATuDAL, THE GENERAL AcREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: AN ARTICLE-BY-ARTICE ANALYSIS IN LAYMAN'S LANGUAGE 4 (U.S. Dep't of State Commercial Policy Series No.
179, 1961). In practice the United States has made certain exceptions. G. PATTERSON,
DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE POLICY ISSUES 1945-1965, 14-15 & n.20

(1966).
2 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (1970). Before 1962 the principle was
stated in Act of June 2, 1934, ch. 474, § 350(a), 48 Stat. 943.
3 The original version is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. pt. 5, at All (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The current version ap-

pears in 4 GATT,

BAsic INSTRUMENTS AND SELEaCTE

DocuMENTs (1969). The current version

of the Agreement will hereinafter be cited as GATT. The "most-favored nation" princple appears in article I.
4 These agreements derive their legal status within the EEC from three separate provisions of the Treaty of Rome. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. Articles 131-36 and the Implementing Convention establish the Association of Overseas Countries and Territories, which is limited to the overseas dependencies of the EEC. Article 238 establishes the framework for "association
agreements" for countries unwilling to incur the obligations of full membership or unable
to do so because of location or political considerations. And articles 111-14 authorize
commercial agreements covering one or more products with other countries. See Note,
Trade Preferencesfor Developing Countries: Options for OrderingInternationalEconomic
and Political Relations, 20 SrAN. L. REv. 1150, 1151-52 (1968).
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examines the elements of a typical EEC agreement which are of concern to the United States and details the expansion and impact of such
agreements from the formation of the EEC until the present. It concludes with the principal responses of the United States to the development of the EEC trade preference system: challenges under the
GATT; acceptance of the "general preference" alternative, whereby
all developed countries jointly grant preferences to all less-developed
countries; and negotiation of its own preferences, principally with
Latin America.
The second part analyzes the policy and legal questions raised by the
recent imposition by the United States of the ten percent surcharge,
concluding that the act exceeded the President's statutory authority to
raise tariffs. Unlike the other responses, which were specific to EEC
trade preferences, the surcharge involved a much wider range of monetary and trade issues. Nonetheless, it encompassed the preference system and must be viewed, in part, as the last United States response.
Two general themes are stressed throughout. First, emphasis is
placed on the evolution of American policy-the gradual erosion of
adherence to the most-favored nation principle coupled with an increased willingness to adopt protectionist policies, if only to encourage
dismantling of the EEC's special preference system. Second, the significance of the preference issue is seen as going beyond the relationship
of the United States and the EEC to the less-developed countriesinvolving, rather, the challenge that the emergent economic and
political power of the EEC provides to the United States.
I.

TRADE PREFERENCES:

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES RESPONSES

A. A Model of Association and Trade Preferences: The Nigerian
Agreement
The agreement between the EEC and Nigeria, negotiated in 1966
but never ratified due to the confusion caused by the Nigerian civil
war, 5 served as a model for later association agreements and illustrates
the issues which they pose.
The agreement established two sets of preferences. First, Nigeria was
5 Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic Community
and the Republic of Nigeria, July 16, 1966, in 5 INT'L LEGAL MATESALs 828 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Nigerian Agreement]. The intervention of the Nigerian civil war probably
accounts for the failure of Nigeria to ratify. See W. ZARTmAN, Tnn PoLmcs OF TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AFIcA AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOCMIC COMMUNITY 93 (1971). Cer-

tain EEC countries, particularly France, also had objections. Id. at 89. See also van den
Bergh, The New Convention of Association with African States, 1 Coam. MKT. L. REV.
156, 162-64 (1963).
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entitled to sell certain goods to EEC countries at a tariff rate below the
common customs tariff (CCT), which all other importers into the Common Market must pay. 6 Second, Nigeria granted reverse preferences
to the EEC, which allowed all EEC countries to import goods into
7
Nigeria at a rate below that paid by other third parties.
The margins of preference granted by both parties were protected
and limited." Thus, Nigeria was specifically prohibited from narrowing
the EEC's margin of preference by lowering its external tariff on those
goods subject to preferences. 9 EEC protection to Nigeria was complicated by its participation in other association agreements which involved the same goods on which it was giving preferences to Nigeria.
Thus, the EEC pledged only that Nigeria's commercial advantages
would be at least equal to those enjoyed by the prior associates, the
eighteen African states of the Yaound6 Convention. 10
The EEC limited the value of the preferences it granted by applying
the quantitative restriction device to Nigeria's principal exports: cocoa
beans, groundnut oil, palm oil, and semi-manufactured wood products.1" This device established a quota ceiling, below which Nigeria
would pay the internal EEC duty (usually zero) that the Six pay in
trade with each other, and above which Nigeria would pay the CCT
rate. The quota ceiling itself was pegged to Nigeria's past volume of
8 Nigerian Agreement, supra note 5, tit. I, art. 2, and exceptions at Protocol No. 1. The
tariff schedules for imports into the EEC appear in OFFICE OF

THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, CUSTOMS TARIFF OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMsUNrrIES (1969)

[hereinafter cited as CUsTOMS TARIFF].

7 Nigerian Agreement, supra note 5, tit. I, art. 3, and exceptions at Protocol No. 2.
8 Id. tit. V, art. 27.
9 Id. Annex IX, para. 1 provides that "[iln respect to the products contained in the
schedule annexed to Protocol No. 2, the tariff advantages reserved for the Member States
over third countries will not be reduced as long as the Agreement remains in force."
10 Id. Annex III. The Yaound6 Convention was an association agreement under article
238 of the Treaty of Rome with the following African States: Bwandi, Cameroons, the
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey,
Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia,
Togo, and Upper Volta. The official French text of the agreement appears at 93 E.E.C.
J.O. 1431 (1964).
11 Nigerian Agreement, supra note 5, Protocol No. 1. These products accounted for
nearly 30 percent of the value of Nigeria's exports in 1964. GATT, DEVELOPMENT PLAN
SrtumEs: THE Fissr Six YEAR PLAN OF NIGERIA 21 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Six YEAR
PLAN]. If palm kernels and groundnuts were also included, these products would comprise
66.7 percent of the total value of Nigerian exports in 1958 and 55.3 percent in 1964. Id.;
P. OKIGBO, A-RICA AND THE COMMON MARKTr 95 (1968). Since 1966 the structure of Nigeria's export trade has changed dramatically. By 1969 petroleum oil accounted for an
increasing percentage of Nigeria's total exports. See 18 NIGERIA FEDERAL OFFICE OF STAnrxcs, DIGEsT, No. 4, at 52 (1969). Earnings from palm oil dropped substantially, from a
monthly average of CN916,00 in 1966 to LN12,000 in 1969, while earnings from groundnut oil and cocoa continued steadily. Id. at 50.
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exports of these goods to the EEC, which means that an expanded
12
volume of production would not receive the preference benefits.
Within the tariff quota, Nigeria received a sizeable advantage since the
CCTs were 5.4 percent on cocoa beans, 14 percent on palm oil, 10-15
percent on groundnut oil, and 13 percent on semi-manufactured wood
products. 13

Nigeria attempted to limit its grant of preferences in two ways.
First, it granted the lowest margin of preference-two percent--on
items which had been supplied principally by third parties such as the
United Kingdom. 14 Second, it granted an increasing preference over
time on certain items. Thus, Nigeria would reduce its tariff to the EEC
to zero over a three-year period on these goods, fifty percent upon
initiation of the agreement and twenty-five percent in each of the two
successive years.' 5
For the purpose of this comment, it is important to identify the two
economic effects of this agreement and others like it which are of interest to the United States: trade creation and diversion 16 and decreases
in exports of nonassociated states.
Trade creation and diversion concerns whether a given preference
tends to shift production to a lower- or higher-cost producer; the
former "creates" trade and the latter "diverts" it. To the extent that the
United States identifies its interests with the efficient allocation of
world resources, it favors agreements which create trade and opposes
12 The ceilings were to increase gradually, but not significantly. In 1968, when the last
full-year quota was determined, the ceilings were 75,200 metric tons for cocoa beans, 7,300
metric tons for groundnut oil, 84,900 metric tons for palm oil, and 620 metric tons for
specified wood products. Nigerian Agreement, supra note 5, Protocol No. 1, art. 3. The
respective quantities of these products exported to EEC countries in 1964 were 78,000
metric tons of cocoa beans, 7,800 metric tons of groundnut oil, 86,000 metric tons of palm
oil, and 6,000 metric tons of sawn timber (exact equivalents of woods named in agreement
unavailable). P. OKIGBO, supra note 11, at 98, Table 5.
13 These were the CCTs which applied after the Kennedy Round, which would have
been applicable during the period the Nigerian Agreement was to be in effect. The Kennedy Round changed the rates only on cocoa beans and plywood, which had been nine
and fourteen percent, respectively. 4 CONTRACrING PARTIES TO THE GATT, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE 1964-1967 TRADE CONFERENCE, Schedule XL, pt.
I, Tariff Item Nos. 18.01, 44.15 (1967). The rates on palm and groundnut oils remained at
the level previously negotiated. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE EMBODYING RESULTS OF THE 1960-61 TARIFF CONFERENCE, Schedule XL, pt. I, Tariff Item No. 15.07 (1962).
14 P. OKIGBO, supra note 11, at ch. 6 app.
15 Nigerian Agreement, supra note 5, Protocol No. 2, art. 1.
16 See generally K. DAM, THE GATT: LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
283-86 (1970); J. VINER, THE CusToMs UNION IsSUE 41-56 (1950); Dam, Regional Economic
Arrangements and the GATT: The Legacy of a Misconception, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 615,
625 (1963).

1971]

Responses to Foreign Trade Preferences

those which do not. Moreover, an efficient allocation of world resources
can be directly beneficial to American consumers. A shift in production
to a higher-cost producer, on the other hand, may result in higher
prices for imports.' 7
These principles can be illustrated by the preference that the EEC
granted to Nigeria on cocoa.' 8 This preference would have shifted
cocoa production away from Ghana, the lowest-cost African producer
of cocoa, to the extent that the 5.4 percent margin of preference offset
Ghana's lower price. 19 Ghana, in turn, having lost a sizeable market,
might have decided to shift its exports from cocoa to another product.
Consumers in the United States might then have had to buy the higherpriced Nigerian cocoa as Ghana and other lower-cost producers phased
out production. Even if Ghana continued to produce for the United
States market, the price of its product might have increased if it could
no longer obtain economies of scale from increased production.
Analysis of trade creation and diversion is complicated by trade effects
which occur between different associated states, as opposed to those
between associated states and nonmember states. A given EEC preference might shift production away from a prior associate to a more
efficient new associate while simultaneously diverting trade from the
most efficient nonmember state. Thus, the EEC preference on palm
oil had the potential of shifting production away from other African
states associated with the EEC under the Yaound6 Convention 20 and
toward Nigeria, a lower-cost producer.2 ' The shift in production might
also, however, come at the expense of a nonmember state, such as
Indonesia, whose cost of production was even lower than Nigeria's.
Along "second best" lines of analysis, the United States would prefer
this situation to one in which Nigeria was even less efficient than other
associates, as in the case of the EEC preference granted to Nigeria on
groundnut oil, where Senegal, the state previously granted a prefer22
ence, was a lower-cost producer.

See G. PATrERSON, supra note 1, at 351-52.
18 Six YEAR PLAN, supra note 11, at 125. This assumes that marginal cost equals price
and that there are no significant differences in shipping costs or governmental subsidies
among exporters.
19 This depends on the assumption that Ghana's price is not substantially lower than
Nigeria's, with the result that its goods are cheaper even when it bears the CCT. Nigeria's
price in 1965 was £106.5.0 and Ghana's was £91.15.6. Id. Of course, if the preference is of
any value, this is not likely to occur.
17

See note 10 supra.
21 P. OKIGBO, supra note 11, at 107. The potential for this shift is limited by the ceiling
20

placed on Nigeria's preferences. Id. at 100.

22 See 24 U.N. FOOD & AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, TRADE YEARBooK 420, Table 120
(1970) (compare unit value of palm oil exports for Indonesia and Nigeria). See also p.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[39;177

The second effect of interest to the United States, decreases in exports of nonassociated states, occurs when production is shifted away
from the United States, whether or not it is the lowest-cost producer.
If a preference is granted either by or to the EEC on a good which is
produced more efficiently by the preference recipient than by the
United States, optimal allocation of resources and the interests of
American consumers are furthered even though particular American
exporters are disadvantaged. Nonetheless, to the extent that the United
States identifies wih the interests of exporters it may still object to the
agreement. This problem does not arise, of course, if the United States
is the lowest-cost exporter.
To complete the analysis, two refinements must be added. First, the
export effect may be incurred on substitute products. Groundnut oil,
for example, is a substitute for other oleagenous products such as soybean oil, a major United States export.23 The price of Nigerian groundnuts in 1966 was approximately fifty percent higher than that of United
States soybeans. 4 Given a taste preference in Europe for groundnut
oil and the lower price of groundnut oil for EEC consumers made
possible by the agreement, the rate of substitution of groundnut oil for
soybean oil might increase. 25 This could occur even if, as is presently
the case, soybeans enter the EEC duty-free. 26 Thus, on the basis of
OoIGBo, supra note 11, at 110 (compare price of groundnut oil exports for Senegal and
Nigeria).
23 The value of United States exports of soybean oil to the EEC in 1969 was
$182,810,594, while the value of all United States soybean oil exports was $327,556,365.
See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. ExPoRTs OF DOMEsIC MERcHANDISE, SIC-BASEn PROD-

uars AND AREA, 1969, at 86-87, Table 1 (1970).
24 SECRETARIAT OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES OF GATT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1968, at

130 nl (1969). In 1968 United States number two soybeans sold for $110 per ton while
Nigerian shelled groundnuts were $166 per ton (CIF European port of entry).
25 For a discussion of substitution theory, see R. IPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 76-78,
104-05, 193-94 (1966); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 31-33, 38-41 (3d ed. 1966). Evidence of the taste preference for groundnut oil is derived from the fact that, although both
soybean and groundnut oil have the same uses, groundnut oil has a significantly higher
per capita consumption in the EEC despite its higher price. D. ELz, OIx.SEE PRODUCT
NEEDS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 1970, at 105, Table 47, 153, Table A38
(1967).
26 CUSTOMS TARIFF, supra note 6, Tariff No. 12.01. See aIso Colonna, The European Economic community, in 2 PREsIDENTIAL COMt'N ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE &
INVESTMENT POLICY, WORKING PAPERs 7, 11 (1971). Even aside from the impact on EEC
demand for soybeans, a perhaps more important effect is that on United States export of
soybean oil. After the 1960-61 tariff negotiations, since known as the Dillon Round, the
EEC-bound duty on soybean oil was 10 percent. 4 U.S. DE,'T OF STATE, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIMS AND TRADE: ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES NEGOTIATIONS 32, Tariff Item
No. 15.07(B)(II)(c)(2)(aa) (Commerdal Policy Series No. 197, 1963). This is also the present
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substitution, efficiency and the exporters' interest would lead the
United States to oppose the Nigerian agreement. 27
The second refinement arises from the close relationship between the
United States and countries, such as those of Latin America, which
may lose exports as a result of association agreements. This decrease
in exports may create severe trade imbalances causing unfavorable
domestic political repercussions and may occasion offsetting United
States expenditures in the form of foreign economic assistance. 2 Association agreements are likely to affect Latin American exports to the
extent that they involve tropical agricultural products. Thus, the
Nigerian agreement affected Latin American countries because they
are major producers of cocoa and groundnut oil.29
Although each association agreement must be judged on its own
terms and on a product-by-product basis,3 0 it does not seem unreasonable to begin with the assumption that they both divert trade and decrease exports. Trade diversion is likely because lower-cost producers do
not need preferences to compete effectively. This assumption would
prove untrue if the lower-cost producer sought an EEC preference to
offset the price effect of a prior preference granted to a higher-cost
producer. 31 However, because the EEC is unlikely to impair this prior
preference in order to keep its other associates satisfied, 32 this is not a
EEC rate, no concessions having been made on this item at the Kennedy Round. See
CusroMs TARiFF, supra note 6, at 60. This could constitute an even higher "effective rate
of protection" for the processed product--soybean oil. See G. CuRzON, MULTiLATERAL COMMERC L DIPLOMACY 229 (1965) (effective rate of protection estimated to be 140 percent).
Thus, the tariff preference for Nigeria over the United States would be quite substantial
because, under the quota ceiling, its groundnut oil was subject to no tariff.
27 See President Nixon's Report to the Congress, Feb. 21, 1971: U.S. Foreign Policy in
the 19701s, 64 DEP'T or STATE BuLL. 401 (1971), in which the President criticized the EEC's
preference policy and urged it "to avoid taking any measures which might threaten our
sales of soybeans . . ."
28 See H. JOHNSON, ECONOMIC PoLIcrS TowARD LESS DEvELOPED CouNTRIEs 1-43 (1967);
Bauer & Wood, Foreign Aid: The Soft Option, 59 BANCA NAZONALE DEL LAvoRo 403-18
(1961). Of course, another way to view the effect on foreign aid expenditures is to say
that the United States saves on aid to African countries benefiting from trade preferences.
However, an equally plausible view is that there are no savings because aid will be continued in order to balance the political advantages secured by the EEC preference policy.
29 In 1964-65, Latin America-principally Brazil-produced 16.4 percent of the world's
cocoa. Six YEAR PLAN, supra note 11, at 117. In 1965, 80 percent of the reported net export
production of groundnuts and groundnut oil come from Nigeria, Senegal, and Argentina.
Argentina produced 19.3 percent of this portion. Id. at 74.
so This type of analysis is suggested in K. DAm, supra note 16, at 292-95.
31 This was the case for Nigerian palm oil production. P. OssGBO, supra note 11, at 107.
This fact accounts, in large part, for Nigeria's desire for association. W. ZARTmAN, supra
note 5, at 81.
32 See text at note 10 supra.
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strong possibility. Decreases in exports are likely because preferences
granted by the EEC are most often on tropical agricultural products
produced in volume in Latin America or in substitute form by the
United States and because preferences granted to the EEC are usually
33
on manufactured goods likely to be exported by the United States.
B.

Expansion of Association Agreements

The expansion by the EEC of its trade preference system has occurred on a large scale and, as GATT Director General Oliver Long
has stated, "could represent a death knell for the multilateral trade
system." 34 By early 1971 the EEC had concluded preference agreements
with the eighteen African states which were former French colonies;
Greece; Turkey; Morocco and Tunisia; Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda;
3
and Spain and Israel.

5

In addition to the agreements presently in effect, many other association agreements are in various stages of negotiation. In the Middle East
the EEC is negotiating with the United Arab Republi 36 and Lebanon;3 7 in Africa with Libya, 38 Algeria,3 9 and the former British Commonwealth states not yet associated (pursuant to British entry into the
Common Market); 40 and in Europe (besides the United Kingdom,
33 Thus, of the total value of £8.8 million in world exports for the twenty-six items of
reverse preferences given by Nigeria to the EEC, machinery parts accounted for £4.4
million. P. OaIGBo, supra note 11, at 135-36, Tables 1-2. The United States is a major exporter of machinery parts and in 1970 exported $378 million worth. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. EXPORTS, SCHEDULE B CoNMIoDrry AND CouNrRY, REPORT FT 410, DEC. 1970,
at 1-10 (1971).
84- U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture, 2 CCH CozM. MET. REP.
9349
(1970).
85 The official French texts of these agreements appear at 93 E.E.C. J.O. 1431 (1964)
(eighteen African states, Yaound6 I); L 282 E.E.C. J.O. 2 (1970) (Yaound6 II); 26 E.E.C.
J.O. 293 (1963) (Greece); 217 E.E.C. J.O. 3687 (1964) (Turkey); L 197 E.E.C. J.O. 3 (1969)
(Morocco); L 198 E.E.C. J.O. 3 (1969) (Tunisia). The agreements with Kenya, Tanzania,
and Uganda and with Spain and Israel have been called "accords" under articles 111-14
of the Treaty of Rome because they were limited to a few major products and did not
involve other political and social provisions usually contained in association agreements.
See Dubois, L'association de la Tunisie et du Maroc t! la Communautd, 12 REvUE DU
MARCHL COMMUN 355 (1969). The official French texts of these agreements appear at L 282
E.E.C. J.O. 55 (1979) (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda); L 182 E.E.C. J.O. 2 (1970) (Spain);
L 183 E.E.C. J.O. 2 (1970) (Israel). For the purposes of this comment, both types of preference agreements will be referred to as association, and the developing countries partidpating in the agreements will be referred to as associates.
86 3 BuL.L. EUROPEAN COMMUNrriEs, No. 12, at 70 (1970) (first-phase negotiations).37 Id.
38 2 CCH Coim. Mxr. REP.
9349 (1970) (preparatory talks).
39 3 BULL. EUROPEAN COMMUN riEs, No. 7, at 75 (1970) (preparatory talks).
40 3 BULL. EUROPEAN COMMUNrrm, Nos. 9-10, at 81 (1970).
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Ireland, Denmark, and Norway for full entry into the Common Mar4
ket)4 ' with Austria,42 Portugal,

3

Malta, and Cyprus. 44

The importance of this expansion may be illustrated by its potential
effect on the agricultural exports of the United States. The EEC currently imports nearly $9 billion in agricultural products. The more
than thirty countries which have actual or potential associate status
account for at least $2 billion of these imports. Of the $2 billion, about
$750 million is represented by products which are competitive with
4
United States agricultural exports. 5
In response to criticism by the United States and other nonmembers
of the system, the EEC has attempted to justify expansion on three
principal grounds: (1) the EEC has historical ties to the developing
countries; (2) the EEC is using preferences to effect a financial transfer
of wealth to the developing countries-i.e., as a form of foreign aid;
and (3) by granting preferences to enough exporters of a given commodity, the EEC can establish the basis for a managed price market in
a given commodity and thus eliminate the wide price fluctuations
which may be harmful to planned export marketing for the lessdeveloped countries.40
These justifications, however, seem less than adequate. First, the
historical argument may explain association with the former Metro
colonies of France or inclusion of the Commonwealth countries if
England joins the Common Market, but it obviously cannot account
for association with such countries as Israel and Spain, which have had
no "special" relationship with the EEC and which are arguably not
47
in the same "developing" category as the states of West or East Africa.
41 3 BULL. EUROPEAN COaMUNrrES, No. 11, at 57 (1970).

42 3 BULL.
43 4 BULL.
44 2 CCH
45 Id. An

EUROPEAN COMMUNrrES, No. 12, at 69 (1970) (negotiations).
EUROPEAN COMMUNrrIEs, No. 3, at 67 (1971).
CoMm. MET. REP. t 9349 (1970).
argument that this represents an insignificant portion of the United States

gross national product only speaks against the significance of foreign trade policy generally. This comment naturally assumes the importance of such policy.
40 See generally Address by M. Edoardo Martino, Member of the EEC Commission, before the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, in 3 BULL. EUROPEAN CoMsUIUNrriES, No. 4, at 11 (1970); Rochereau, Introduction, 12 REvUE DU MARCHA- COMmUN
217 (1969).
47 See the tables of comparative estimated gross national products and other economic
indicators in 2 DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, STATISICAL OFFICE OF THE U.N.,
YEARBOOK OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS STATIsmcs: INTERNATIONAL TABLES, 1969 (1970). One
might argue that Spain and Israel do indeed have a "special" relationship with the EEC
-Spain through its general ties with EEC countries and Israel through its particular relationship with West Germany. If this logic is pursued, however, then every country has
a "special" relationship with at least one EEC country because of the latter's long existence.
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Second, it is clear that a financial transfer to an associate may in fact
be-paid for by third parties through decreases in exports. Moreover, an
"aid" policy characterized by reverse preferences contains strong counterproductive elements. Thus, for every dollar of "aid" an associated
state receives through EEC preferences, it loses a substantial part of a
dollar by foregoing the opportunity to buy lower-priced exports. 48
Third, as to the managed market argument, although the EEC is the
major market for many African commodities, 49 such as cocoa, it is not
the only market. Conversely, those countries receiving EEC preferences
on cocoa are not the only producers. Without almost exclusive control
on both, the demand and supply sides, the EEC cannot stabilize world
prices on a given commodity. Moreover, managed markets may not be
desirable on their own merits because they may encourage continued
production by nonefficient producers. 50
More plausible explanations for the EEC expansionist policy are
based on (1) EEC foreign economic objectives and (2) the expansionary
logic of any large trade preference system.
. Relying heavily on American defense, Europe is unable to increase
its world influence through other than economic means.5 ' It is in the
economic sphere, in which the EEC is the largest market in the world
48 The claim of the EEC to development goals is belied also by the Common Market's
reluctance to grant substantial preferences on semi-manufactured and processed agricultural goods. See U.N. Doc. TD/B/329, TD/B/AC,5/36 (mimeograph). See also Les Prdfdrences: Le R6le qu'elles pouvaient jouer dans le cadre d'une politique d'aide a l'expansion
commerciale des pays en voie de ddvdlopment: un ddbat nouveau sur des themes anciens,
8 REvuE Du MAxcHA CommuN 371, 375 (1965).
49 In 1969 the EEC accounted for 35.5 percent of the total value of world imports. See
24 U.N. FOOD &AcGRCULTURAL ORGANIZATON, supra note 22, at 252, Table 64.
50 See L. TOWLE, INTERNATIONAL TIDE AND COMMERCIAL POLICY 735-36 (2d ed. 1956).
The inability of the EEC to manipulate world prices of a commodity derives from the
facts that the negotiation of preferences does not include any arrangement to manage the
supply of the commodity and that, even if supply management grew out of a preference
arrangement, it would be unlikely to succeed because of the lack of control by the partialpants over world output. The importance of the latter point is confirmed by prior failures
of private cartel arrangements. "The restriction of output by cartels has often been neutralized by the simultaneous expansion of output on the part of outsiders. Production or
export control cannot be effective unless it covers nearly total world production or exports." Id. See also Hawkins, Epstein, & Gonzales, Stabilization of Export Receipts and
Economic Development-InternationalCommodity Agreements and Compensatory Financing Plans, BULL. OF INsT. OF FINANCE, N.Y.U. GRAD. ScH. OF Bus. AD., No. 40, at 21-22
(1966).
51 Cf. H. KISSINGER, THm TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP 8-28 (1965). This view may suggest
that political objectives, such as the increased prominence of the EEC in shaping the
international order, may be independent of the economic objectives of the trade preference
policy. Whether this political objective is peculiar to France as compared with the other
EEC countries or is traceable to the EEC Commission as a means of maximizing its role
is uncertain. Cf. J.W. EVANS, Tim KENNEDY ROUND IN AaMERAN TRADE POLICY 59-60
(1971).
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for imports, 52 that European power is at its maximum. The existence
of this market allows the EEC to offer significant trade preferences to
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East which cannot be offered by the
United States or other countries. Also, reverse preferences obviously
bring direct gains for EEC export interests by enabling them to compete successfully against lower-cost competitors. Moreover, such reverse
preferences are sought to obtain a political commitment by the recipients to the EEC. France has argued that economic benefits should not
be granted by the EEC without a political commitment from the country seeking association5R
The second explanation for expansion must be found in the expansionary logic of the system itself. Since nonassociated countries face
more stiff competition in the EEC market as a result of prior association agreements, they have a major incentive to seek association in
order to share in the preference system. The series of agreements on
citrus products, first with Tunisia and Morocco and then with Spain
and Israel, illustrate the desire of the latter to offset the advantage
given to the former54 This expansionary logic is extended by the fact
that those seeking to equalize the grant of prior preferences receive new
preferences on still other products; the expansion then continues in
another sequence of agreements. 55
The dynamic principles operating on the recipient side find their
counterpart on the EEC side. Member countries which, as a result of
prior agreements, may be required to forego lower prices for goods
when higher-cost producers receive preferences will support new prefer52 In 1968 the EEC accounted for 24.6 percent of the total value of world imports and
26.8 percent of world exports. Comparative figures for the United States were 13.1 and
14.3 percent, respectively. See DEr'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFrAiRs, STATsTrCAL. OFFICE OF
THE U.N., YEARBoox OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS, 1968, at 12-15, Table A (1970).
53 W. ZARTMAN, supra note 5, at 82-83. The actual nature of this political commitment
is somewhat unclear. Generally, France has expected support for EEC preference policies.
Id. A possible explanation for the specific insistence on reverse preferences is that they
entail political costs for the government granting them in that they may increase the cost
to consumers of imported goods and that, having "sold" their country on the policy,
grantor governments are not likely to withdraw from the preference arrangement without
major changes in circumstances.
54 The EEC imports about $51 million of citrus products per year. EEC STATIsTICAL
OFFICE, AUSSENHANDEL ZUSAMMENFASSUNG DER EWG-EINFUHR [SUMMARY OF THE EEC ImPORTS] 4, Table 1, CST 51.1-.2 (1969). Thus, in 1968, after Morocco, which had world

exports of $83.5 million, 23 U.N. FOOD & AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, TRADE YEARBOOK,
1968, at 156, 159, Tables 39-40 (1969), and Tunisia, which had world exports of $3 million,
id. at 156, 160, Tables 39-40, received preferences, Spain, which exported $111 million, and
Israel, which exported $88 million, id. at 154, 159, 163, Tables 39-40, had a great incentive
to receive preferences of their own.

55 Cf. Hudec, GATT or GABB? The Future Design of the General Agreement of Tariffs,
and Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299, 1362-63 (1971).
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ences with comparatively lower cost producers to reduce these prices.
It was precisely for this reason that West Germany and the Netherlands
supported association with Nigeria-to reduce the costs on goods subject to preferences under the agreement with the eighteen African
states.5 8
The logic of expansion is limited, however, by two factors. First, if
the EEC is to grant new preferences, it cannot bear too great an expense
with respect to goods produced in significant quantity by EEC members themselves. EEC producers would oppose lowering tariffs on goods
produced by them because the lower price on foreign goods would cut
into their own market. The EEC has met this problem, however, by
establishing conditional preferences. 57 Morocco, for example, receives
a preference on citrus fruits only when the EEC's internal production
is insufficient to meet demand. When there is a surplus within the EEC,
Moroccan citrus becomes subject, as that of other countries, to the
"variable levy."58
Expansion is limited, secondly, by the ability of the EEC to apportion preference benefits among multiple preference recipients. The
EEC has attempted to surmount this obstacle through a number of
devices. One is the granting of different margins of preference to different recipients. Thus, the EEC was able to negotiate citrus agreements
with Spain and Israel and not adversely affect the prior recipients,
Morocco and Tunisia, by granting an eighty percent preference to the
latter and only a forty percent preference to the former. 59 Since Spain
and Israel were lower-cost producers,0° all four countries were given
56 See W. ZARTMAN, supra note 5, at 33, 81.
57 GATT, BAsIc INSTRUMENTS AND SELEcrED DocuMENTS 62 (17th Supp. 1970).
58 The system thus works differently depending on whether exporters' prices are lower
or higher than the established "reference price." See Dam, The European Common
Market in Agriculture, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 209, 256-65 (1967). When Moroccan prices are
lower than the reference price-which implies that the EEC is oversupplied internally
with citrus-Morocco gets no preference and is subject to the variable levy. When Moroccan prices are higher than the reference price, on the other hand, a preference is granted.
This is accomplished by the fact that an eight to fifteen percent tariff (depending on the
particular citrus fruit) is customarily levied on imports whose prices (CIF European
port of entry) are higher than the reference price. See Dubois, Le Rdgime des dschanges
dans le cadre de Paccord crdant une association entre la communautd dconomique europeenne et Le royaume de Maroc, 14 REvUE DO MARc-A ComruN 41, 50-51 (1971).

59 Dubois, supra note 58. Turkey, as part of its association agreement, also receives a
forty percent conditional preference on citrus.

60 That Spain and Israel are lower-cost producers of citrus fruits than Morocco and
Tunisia is strongly suggested by the comparative values of their citrus exports per metric
ton. In 1969 these were as follows: Spain, $105; Israel, $130; Morocco, $139; and Tunisia,
$146. See 24 U.N. FooD

40-42.

& AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZ=TION,

supra note 22, at 159-70, Tables
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comparable advantages in the EEC market. A second principal device
is quantitative restrictions. The EEC, by selecting appropriate ceilings
for tariff quotas, can divide its market demand among a number of
preference recipients.61
C.

United States Response to Trade Preferences

The four principal responses of the United States to the development
of the EEC trade preference system have been (1) challenges under the
GATT; (2) acceptance of the "general preference" alternative,
whereby all developed countries jointly grant preferences to all lessdeveloped countries; (3) negotiation of its own preferences, principally
with Latin America; and (4) imposition of the ten percent surcharge.
1. Challenges Under the GATT. Although any definition of the
GATT is difficult, 62 for the purpose of this comment it may be considered to be the substantive and procedural rules embodied in the legal
document bearing the name General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.6 This agreement is adhered to by the United States and the
other major nations of the world.64
The central substantive rule of international trade that GATT
establishes is the "most-favored nation" principle. It provides that
any advantage, favour or privilege or immunity-granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally
to the like product originating in or destined for the territories
of all other contracting parties. 65
One of the major exceptions to this principle is the establishment of
a free trade area. 66 In order for a trade agreement to qualify as a free
trade area, it must satisfy two main requirements: (1) "substantially
all" the duties and restrictive regulations of commerce must be eliminated in the trade of the participants, 67 and (2) a "plan and a schedule"
61 This was the device used in the Nigerian Agreement. See text at note 12 supra.
62 K. DAm, supra note 16, at 335 & n.1; Hudec, supra note 55, at 1299 & n2.
63 See note 3 supra.
64 In May, 1970, there were seventy-seven contracting parties to the GATT. GATT,
supra note 57, at vii.
65 GATT art. I, para. 1.
66 Id. art. XXIV; see K. DAM, supra note 16, at 274-95; J. JACKSON, WoarL TRADz AND
LAw oF GATT 575-623 (1969). The theory behind the exception was that customs
unions, as opposed to preference arrangements, would eliminate all customs barriers beTm

tween participants and thus, on balance, support the objectives of free trade policy. See
C. WiLcox, A CHARTRa roR WoRLD TRADE 70-71 (1949).
67 GATT art. XXIV, para. 8(a)(1).
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,must be established for the complete elimination of all restrictions on
trade. 68
The "substantially all" requirement is subject to a great deal of
ambiguity. Thus, it is possible that the requirement may demand a
reduction on all items of trade or only on items covered by a particular
trade agreement. 69 Moreover, the requirement may or may not be
inconsistent with the use of tariff quotas, which set ceilings on tariff
reduction.7 0 In spite of this ambiguity, it is clear that most if not all
EEC agreements do not meet the requirements for a free trade area.
For example, in the 1964 and 1970 Yaound6 agreements with the eighteen African states, there was no apparent "plan" or "schedule " to
eliminate internal barriers to trade; quantitative restrictions were
broadly applied to African exports, raising the "substantially all" question; and, in the case of the 1964 agreement, some of the associated
71
states' tariff levels were to be raised.
The United States has attempted to limit the expansion of the EEC
preference system by challenging these agreements under the GATT
as inconsistent with the substantive requirements of a free trade area.
Such challenges are facilitated by the GATT provision that any contracting party deciding to enter into a free trade area arrangement must
promptly notify the other contracting parties and provide information
68 Id. art. XXIV, para. 5(c). One additional requirement of less direct concern is that
the common external tariffs of the free trade area participants not be higher or more
restrictive than those existing previously. Id. art. XXIV, para. 5(b). Pressures to increase
tariffs may occur if the external tariffs of participants are not high enough to make a
preference meaningful-i.e., if the lowest-cost producer can outsell the free trade participant even when subject to the tariff.
69 From the viewpoint of economic effidency, the "substantially all" requirement should
be interpreted to mean a sizeable reduction on all items of trade. See K. DAM, supra note
16, at 279-80; GATT, BAsic INSTRUMENTs AND Sm.EcrE DocumENrrs 99 (6th Supp. 1958).
70 K. DAM, supra note 16, at 280-81. The GATT provides that quantitative restrictions, as "restrictive regulations of commerce," must be eliminated on "substantially all"
intermember trade, except that, "where necessary," quantitative restrictions may be imposed if permitted under article XI (protection of certain agricultural and fisheries products), article XII (safeguard of balance of payments), article XV (exchange restrictions
approved by International Monetary Fund), and article XX (specific exceptions such as
"necessary to protect public morals"). GATT art. XXIV, para. 8. Moreover, subject to
certain exceptions, it requires that quantitative restrictions be applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Id. art. XIII. The serious problem arises when the EEC uses the tariff
quota device to apportion preferences among recipients. See text at note 57 supra. Since
the use of this device is central to the apportionment and thus to the entire EEC preference system, it is in the interest of the United States to attack its use within trade preference agreements, as it did in the case of Yaound6 I. See GATT, BAsic INSTRUMENTs AND
SELECrED DocumEms 100, 103-04, 113-14 (14th Supp. 1966).
71 GATT, supra note 70, at 100-15.
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about the association to assist review by member nations.7 2 It is during
the review process that the United States may raise its objections.
GATT review has, however, proved inadequate to protect United
States interests because of the availability under the agreement of two
broad waiver provisions which permit the contracting parties to waive
conformity with the substantive requirements of free trade areas. The
first provision permits a two-thirds majority of the contracting parties
to approve the agreement if "such proposals lead to the formation of
...a free trade area in the sense of this Article." 73 This waiver presupposes a thorough GATT review of the agreement and a finding that
there is reason to believe the arrangement will lead to a free trade
area. A second, even more general provision requires no specific findings and therefore operates as a general escape clause. This waiver
requires a two-thirds majority of all parties voting, which must com74
prise more than half of the entire GATT membership.
In only one case, the initial GATT review of the Spain and Israel
agreement in 1969, has United States opposition to EEC trade preference agreements enjoyed even limited success. There, GATT's Working
Party rejected application of escape clause treatment and in so doing
seemed to lay down certain limits on the granting of waivers.7 5 Its
report urged that preferences be restricted to less-developed countries
on a nondiscriminatory basis to avoid violations of the most-favored
nation principle. 76 This policy would, however, not be consistent with
that principle-it would only generalize the exception to it, thus minimizing "bilateralism" in the field of tariffs.
Following the GATT rejection, the ECC indicated that it would be
willing to review the agreement provisions. This decision of the EEC
cannot, however, be taken as a clear sign of the effectiveness of GATT
challenges by the United States. An equally plausible explanation of
this deference to GATT could be the EEC's own problems in negotiating agreements between the African and Mediterranean preference
recipients on the division of benefits. 7 7 This view is supported by the
fact that the most recent Spain-Israel agreement makes few changes
78
along lines recommended by GATT.
72 GATT art. XXIV, para. 7(a).
73 Id. art. XXIV, para. 10.
74 Id. art. XXV, para. 5.
75 GATT, supra note 51, at 61-69 (1970).
76 Id. at 67.
77 See Dubois, supra note 58, at 50-51.
78 See GATT, supra note 51, at 61-69.
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GATT treatment of the Yaound6 agreements of 1964 and 1970
demonstrates the more usual result-a willingness to support waiver
despite nonconformity with substantive requirements. Thus, review
of the first agreement was never concluded and resulted only in a recommendation for further study, 79 which was in effect a waiver of rejection of the agreement. Moreover, in 1970 the Working Party recommended approval of the second agreement under the more specific
waiver, finding that the agreement was moving toward freer trade
between the participants. That recommendation was sustained by the
GATT membership despite intense opposition from the United States,
Japan, Chile, and Argentina."0
The complete futility of GATT review has been indicated by the
EEC's refusal, in the case of GATT rejection of a specific waiver for
the Morocco-Tunisia agreement,8 ' to be bound by the GATT finding.
After rejection, the EEC stated unilaterally that it deemed the procedure for the examination of the agreements completed and took the
position that the application of the specific waiver was automatic and
required no vote by the contracting parties.8 2 The EEC was stating in
effect that if it felt waiver was justified, it would consider waiver
granted even in the face of express GATT rejection.
The ease of obtaining waivers and the EEC's refusal to be bound by
GATT decisions represents the failure of the legal argumentation
policy pursued by the United States in the GATT forum. It is clear
that the EEC will continue to expand its trade preference system despite GATT disapproval. Whereas the United States continually
stresses that these agreements must meet or have the potential to meet
substantive GATT requirements, the EEC dismisses this approach and
finds sufficient justification from its own proclaimed reasons for seeking association. Its attitude is dearly reflected in its 1970 annual report:
In all these cases, . . . there is a lack of proportion between the

United States' attitude and requests, and the actual economic or
commercial significance of this question. The American attitude
appears to the Commission even less comprehensible in view of the
political importance of the special relations which the Community
79 See GATT, supra note 70, at 100, 115.

80 Le Monde Diplomatique, Jan., 1971, at 23, col. 1.
81 See 3 BULL. EUROPEAN COMMUNITiF, No. 11, at 66 (1970). As the Working Party
noted, "Ilhe preferences had been put in force on I September without waiting for the
outcome of the examination by GATT of the application for a waiver. They pointed out
that such an early introduction of preferences created a de facto situation which was

without precedent." Id. at 68.
82 3 BULL. EUROPEAN Comuimrrms, Nos. 9-10, at 17 (1970).
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maintains in order to take account of obvious historical, geographical and economic factors. 83
The ultimate source of the GATT failure may be found in the
reluctance of the United States to engage in "controlled" retaliation to
EEC action by withdrawing tariff concessions granted to the EEC, a
withdrawal which is authorized after approval by GATT.8 ' While
United States policy did assume a new tack after the failure of GATT,
it was not toward retaliation but competition with the EEC based on
a new United States acceptance of preferences. This departure from
commitment to the most-favored nation principle signaled a major
shift in United States foreign economic policy.
2. Acceptance of the "General Preference" Alternative.-a. The
proposal. The history of the interaction of the United States and the
EEC on the issue of general preferences reveals three significant
themes: the reluctance of the EEC to grant general preferences at the
expense of associates, the refusal of the United States to grant general
preferences to associates and the consequent inducement for associates
to abandon their EEC commitments, and the failure of the United
States competition strategy.
General preferences, as advocated by the less-developed countries
since the early 1960s, are preferences extended by developed countries
to all less-developed countries on all export items of interest to the latter. Such preferences would consist of lower tariff rates for imports
from the less-developed countries into the developed countries than are
set for trade between the developed countries.8 5 A major advantage
that the United States perceived in such a system was the effective end
to the expansion of EEC association. 6 General preferences had the
potential of "internationalizing" the granting of preferences, thus terminating the EEC's domination of the field. Moreover, since the lessdeveloped countries' proposal did not envision reverse preferences, it
had the potential of offering a viable alternative to affiliation with the
EEC system.
83 Comm'N OF THn Euptoz'AN COMMUNrrins, FOURTH GENMtAL REPORT 323 (1970).

84 GATT art. XXIII. It provides:

1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly
under this Agreement is being ... impaired or that the attainment of any objective
of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of . ..

(c) the existence of any other situation, ... land]
2 . .. If the Contracting parties consider that the circumstances are serious enough
to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend
...concessions."
See K. DAM, supra note 16, at 353-68.
85 See generally G. PATrEasON, supra note 1, at 323-47.
85 See text at note 106 infra.
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Since 1964 the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), whose membership is composed of the seventy-seven
less-developed countries, 7 has served as a forum for the general preference proposal. The concept was originally opposed by both the EEC
and the United States, although for different reasons.
b. Initial opposition. In 1963, preliminary to the first meeting of
the underdeveloped countries at the 1964 World Trade and Development Conference, the EEC and the United States voiced opposition to
one of the less-developed countries' first proposals, which would have
eliminated all tariffs on products of special interest to those countries,
principally tropical foods and selected manufactured and processed
goods. The EEC refused to endorse the proposal because the dismantling of trade barriers would render meaningless the margins of preference it had granted to the Yaound6 states and would expose EEC producers to significant competition. 8
Instead, the EEC proposed a "managed market" concept, to be
directed to the organization of international trade in products of interest to the less-developed countries. The EEC felt that such organization
was essential to protect the interests of the associates.8 9 When the managed market proposal met with general disapproval, the EEC formulated another alternative, the Brasseur Plan, a system of selected and
negotiated preferences as opposed to the general and automatic preferences being advocated by the less-developed countries. 90 Although the
plan had some advantages with respect to trade diversion since it would
allow an examination of the economic consequences of subjecting any
particular product to a preference, its main advantage was protection
for the associates by the granting of a preference of somewhat less value
than association preferences on the same product and by the selection
for preferences of products other than those already covered in association agreements. 91
The United States during this period opposed any form of prefer87 See E. PA soNs, A RLVImv OF UNCTAD II (1968). For background on the formation

of UNCTAD, see K.
77-109 (1965).

HAC;RAS, UNrrE- NATIONS CONFRENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

88 G. PATTERsoN, supra note 1, at 349 n.46. As the author notes, involved in the EEC
refusal "was that for them any such dismantling of trade barriers would deprive some
of the associated states of their privileged position in the Six and could also, via its effects
on free trade arrangements among themselves and so on the products in question, change
the internal balance of the quid pro quo within the Six." Id.
89 See GATT, supra note 51, at 63 (managed market argument used to support citrus
preferences).
90 6 UNCTAD, PRocF INGS 23-25 (1964).
91 See generally U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.l/l, at 21 (1965) (offidal statement of UNCTAD
Sec. Gen. Raill Prebisch outlining objections to the Brasseur Plan).
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ences. Aside from its steady commitment to the most-favored nation
principle, American policy makers feared that discussion of the question
of general preferences during the Kennedy Round would reduce incentives for lowering tariff barriers on a nondiscriminatory basis.92 Officials
were also concerned that congressional approval could not be obtained
for such preferences since a further lowering of tariffs would decrease
the margin of protection for American producers on items of "special
interest" to the less-developed countries. 3 The final ground for United
States opposition was that such preferences were likely to divert trade.9 4
The World Trade Conference of 1964 was unwilling to accept the
Brasseur Plan and instead called for preferences to be "extended uni'95
formly by all developed countries in a nondiscriminatory manner.
However, the African associated states, unwilling to give up their
exclusive EEC preferences, successfully inserted a section providing
that "special treatment may be granted by developed countries to the
less developed among developing countries,"9' 6 a provision which
would permit a specific exemption without necessarily generalizing
exemptions for future association agreements. Differences among the
parties to the Conference resulted in no plan being adopted. Moreover,
as the EEC expanded its association agreements to include more developed countries, such as Spain and Israel, the strategy of the "lessdeveloped" exemption became insufficient to protect its associates'
interests.
c. United States acceptance. Between 1964 and 1968, the year in
which the second World Trade Conference (UNCTAD II) was held,
three major interrelated events occurred: the EEC expanded its association agreements, the United States changed its policy on general preferences, and the less-developed countries not associated with the EEC
campaigned even more strongly than before for general preferences.
The nature of the EEC association expansion has already been examined. 97 The interplay between this expansion and general preferences is, however, of interest. Expansion not only tended to undermine
whatever unity may have existed among the less-developed countries
in their demand for general preferences but also fed itself on the failure
92 G. PATURSON, supra note 1, at 354. See also H.

JOHNSON,

supra note 28, at 35-36.

93 G. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 355.
94 H. JOHNSON, supra note 28, at 36. For a summary of arguments for and against gen-

eral preferences, see McNeill, Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries, 60 AM. Soc.
INT'L PROCEEDINGS 93 (1966). See also

(1968).

J.

PINcus, TRADE AID AND DEVELOPMENT 197-219

95 U.N. Doc. E/Conf./46/AC.2/L40, at para. VII (1964).
90 Id.
97 Text at note 35 supra.
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to implement such a system. Association instead of general preferences
appealed to certain less-developed countries which were not interested
in indefinitely deferring participation in a preference system.98
The success of EEC expansion also was responsible for the first major
change in United States policy on preferences. Thus, in late 1967 President Johnson indicated that the United States would now be willing
to "explore" a scheme by which all developed countries would grant
tariff preferences to all less-developed countries. 99 This proposal singled
out certain products, principally semi-processed as opposed to raw
ones, 100 which-were not generally covered under association agreements
.because inclusion would threaten internal EEC processors of raw
products. The proposal was, therefore, attractive to both associates and
nonassociates.
A major contributing factor to the decision to change policy seems
,to have been pressure brought by Latin America. As one United
States policy maker stated:
-

Latin American countries have viewed the EEC-African Association system with fear and suspicion. Since Africa and Latin America produce many of the same products, the EEC's grant to African
countries of preferential entry into the EEC has put Latin America, which faces the substantial common-external tariff, at a considerable disadvantage in the markets of the Community.10 '
Another probable contributing factor was the failure of the Kennedy
Round to lower tariffs or eliminate nontariff barriers on items of
interest to the less-developed countries, especially processed agricultural
produce and semi-manufactured goods.102 This failure was, of course,
due partly to the EEC's unwillingness to narrow the margins of preferences available for old and new associates.103
98 G. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 868. The refusal to wait was partially responsible for

Nigeria seeking association.
99 This decision was announced at the April 13, 1967 meeting of the chiefs of state of
the countries in the Organization of American States, 56 DmPr STATE BULL. 706, 709
(1967).
100 The Johnson proposal was subsequently elaborated upon in a meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. See
Peterson, The United States and the Developing Countries, 2 FOREIGN TRADE Rv. 393,
401 (1967); cf. 57 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 876 (1967) (communique issued by the Ministerial
Council on November 30, 1967).
101 Peterson, supra note 100, at 401.
102 UNCTAD, THE KENNEDY RouND's ESTIMATED EFFECTS ON TARr BARRIERs, pts. 1-2,
at 17-18 (1968) (report of Secretary General Prebisch). Whereas the overall tariff cuts at the
Kennedy Round were thirty-six percent, on items of interest to the developing countries
the cut was only twenty percent.
103 This was the view of Agency for International Development Director Sidney Wein-
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-'Despite the change in United States policy, little teal progress was
made at the 1968 Conference because the United States and the EEC
countries, particularly France, could not agree -on the principles of any
plan. 10 4 Two major issues still divided them: the selection of products
and the disposition of the EEC association agreements.
d. Inability to formulate a "common" plan. Following UNCTAD
II, the developed countries agreed to undertake the formulation of a
"ccommon" general preference plan for presentation to UNCTAD in
1970. Such a plan was envisioned as a joint offer, on unified principles,
of general preferences by all developed countries to all less-developed
countries. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was to serve as the forum for arriving at a common plan
which would attempt to resolve conflicts among the developed countries with respect to the products and policy of a general preference
plan. Not unexpectedy, the developed countries could not agree and
instead submitted separate proposals to the Special Committee on Preferences, the working group of UNCTAD.10 5 Attention will be focused
on the two most important of these plans, those of the United States
and the EEC.
i. Initial United States plan. The initial United States plan contained eight major points: (1) preferential duties would be set at zero;
(2) preferences would be granted on manufactured and semi-manufactured goods-except for textiles, shoes, and petroleum products-and on a selected list of agricultural and fishery products; (3)no ceilings
would be established for the import preferences, but a standard escape
clause would protect domestic industry; (4) the preferences would last
no more than ten years and would neither "constitute a binding commitment" nor "impede future tariff reductions on a most-favored
nation basis"; (5) a common plan would be adopted by all major developed countries; (6) United States preferences would not be granted
to those countries already granted special preferences by developed
countries; (7) the United States would not grant preferences to countries granting reverse preferences; and (8) the preferences actually
traub. He observed: "One major reason ... that tariffs and other trade restrictions have
been and are being maintained tis] for the purpose of permitting preferences, This is certainly the reason for the EEC tariffs on coffee, cocoa, bananas, and other tropical products-the tariff permits preferences to Associated African producers." S. WmmAuB,TRADE
PRMENCs FOR LEss DEmVoPED CouNRm: AN ANALYsrs or U.S. PoAcy 131 (1966).
104 Cf. Note, La Confdrence de New Delhi, 14 AN~uAzn F. ANqAs D. DRorr INTERNATIONAL 582, 592 (1968).
105 U.N. Doc. TD/B/243/Rev.1 (mimeograph). Mimeographed, United Nations materials cited in this comment are not dated but appear to have been issued within the past
year.
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granted would be to all less-developed countries, no distinction being
made between less- and least-developed countries. 10
ii. Initial EEC plan. The initial EEC plan was quite different from
that of the United States. 0 7 As submitted to the OECD, it contained
the following provisions: Preferences would be equivalent to zero duty,
as under the United States plan, but would apply only to manufactured
and semi-manufactured products and not to agricultural products and
would be granted only within a fixed ceiling. The ceiling would be
established on a product-by-product basis and would generally be equal
to past EEC imports of the particular product plus five percent of the
value of all other imports of the same item from all other countries:
It was further provided that, "in order to limit the preferences granted
to the more competitive developing country or countries and to reserve a substantial share for the less competitive, preferential imports
of a given product from a single developing country should not, as a general rule, exceed 50 [percent] of the ceiling fixed for that product."' 08
The proposal was a quite sophisticated attempt to protect the EEC's
position with the associates. It covered no raw agricultural products,
the main subject of past EEC preferences. Moreover, linking the ceiling
to past performance data froze in the past advantages of the preference
takers. Finally, the fifty percent ceiling for any one country was added
insurance that the least-efficient producers, usually the associated African states, would still be advantaged. Many of these limitations were
demanded by countries with whom the EEC was currently negotiating
for association. °
Before transmitting a plan to the Special Committee, the United
States made major revisions in its plan, while the EEC made very few.
These changes were designed to maximize acceptance by the lessdeveloped countries. These were the plans considered by the seventyseven country group.
iii. Revised plans. The revised plan of the United States embodied
a modification of its position on the granting of preferences to the
associated states. It still excluded from its coverage those countries
granting reverse preferences to the EEC. However, this exclusion would
be eliminated if the recipients provided adequate assurance that the
preferences would be phased out within a reasonable amount of time
106 U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.5/24/Add.5 (mimeograph). Due to the EEC commitment to its
associates, there seems to have been little basis for the United States to have believed that

the EEC would accept the plan.
107 See 3 BULL. EURoPE-AN COMMUNms, No. 1, at 78, 79
108

U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.5/34/Add.5 (mimeograph).

109 See 14 E.E.C. J.0., No. C 13, at 9 (1971).

(1970).
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and in any event by 1975. The United States also abandoned its demand for a common plan. Instead, its "submission emphasize[d] the
importance of adopting schemes that are harmonized to the extent
possible and can be expected to achieve comparable results, thus ensuring equitable burden-sharing."1 10
The abandoning of the common plan only represented an acknowledgement of the inability to achieve agreement. The equitable burdensharing concept seems to indicate that the United States viewed as
burdensome the granting of preferences which could produce higher
costs to American consumers and increase competition to American
producers. Of course, to the EEC, which had designed its association
agreements to minimize costs to domestic producers, higher costs to
its consumers was the price of achieving its foreign economic objectives.
The United States, on the other hand, did not at this time consider
the preference system politically advantageous.
The change of position on coverage for associated states was an
attempt to present some difficult choices to these countries. If they were
presently to give up their EEC preferences and phase out their reverse
preferences, they would have had increased access to the United States
market. It was unlikely, however, that this type of competitive inducement would work. Benefits of the EEC preference system were actual,
whereas the United States system was contingent on, among other factors, congressional approval."1 Moreover, for most associated countries
and those negotiating for association, the EEC represented a larger
market for their exports than the United States." 2 Furthermore, entry
into the United States preference system would occasion competition
with the Latin American countries that they could avoid in the EEC
110 U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.5/34/Add.5 (mimeograph). In October, 1970 the United States
made still one further change in its proposal, dropping its objection to special preferences
-those given by the EEC to associates-but retaining the requirement for a phase-out of
reverse preferences. Although the United States indicated that it would be "reasonable
as to the kind of assurance" it would accept for the phase.out, any kind of commitment
by developing countries would upset their association relationships. The change in the
United States position seems to reflect the failure of using participation in its own plan
as an incentive for altering association relationships. Moreover, its new position allowed
it to pursue its own special preference policies. U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.5/34/Add.5/Rev.I/
Corr.1 (mimeograph).
111 Since under section 251 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (1970),
reductions in tariffs must be on a most-favored nation basis, the President would have to
go to Congress for new legislation to implement the proposal. The contingency problem
could not have been side-stepped by countries making their own contingent commitment
to the United States plan pending congressional action because such a strategy would
have required making a break with the EEC which could incur political costs, even if the
actual break was only contingent.
112 Cf. note 52 supra.
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system. Finally, a certain degree of political commitment to the EEC
had accompanied their entry into the association.
The revised EEC plan contained no shift in principles. The major
change was, rather, an agreement to grant non-tariff quota preferences
on processed agricultural items by reducing the CCT by a fixed percentage. 113 The EEC could, of course, set the margin of preference at
a high enough rate to protect the margin granted to associated states.
It was in effect proposing a triple tariff plan."14
iv. The "agreed conclusions" of UNCTAD. The Special Committee
on Preferences, faced with the disparate plans," 5 could not resolve the
differences. As a result, it issued a peculiar report, entitled "Agreed
Conclusions of the Special Committee on Preferences," which did little
more than record the areas of agreement and disagreement among the
various plans." 6
While this report characterized the preferences to be granted as
"'generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory" and granted for
the purpose of increasing the export earnings and rates of development
of the less-developed countries, it was clear by the end of the Conference
that the preferences proposed were only nonreciprocal; they were
neither general nor nondiscriminatory. This was because associated
countries were unlikely to end association and thus would be unable
7
to participate in the United States preference plan."1
Consequently, the EEC and the United States actually drew up lists
of products and beneficiaries which would receive special preferences.
While the United States excluded the associates, the EEC made certain
through its manipulation of product coverage, exception lists, depths
of tariff cuts, and ceilings that the new beneficiaries would not prejudice
the position of the associates. In effect, the EEC aimed its benefits at
113 U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.5/34/Add.1

(mimeograph).
114 The multiple tariff level device had been proposed originally in the context of
association negotiations with Nigeria in order to protect old entrants against potential
new ones. W. ZARTMAN, supra note 5, at 84. Now it was to be used to protect all associates
against the potential general preference takers.
115 The plans were submitted to UNCTAD on September 19, 1970. U.N. Doc. TD/B/
AC.5/34 (mimeograph).
116 The "agreed conclusions" appear in U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.5/36 (mimeograph).
117 Jamaica, for example, pointed out that this provision excluded Commonwealth
countries as well as associates, although by the end of 1970 its apprehension was probably
related more to its hope that it would receive preferences from the EEC upon entry of
the United Kingdom into the Common Market. Cf. Lemaitre, Ndgociations Anglaises: Les
Six se familiarisent avec le dossier mais n'arrdtent pas de vdritables tactiques communes,
REvUE DU MARCs COMMUN 127 (1970). It asked the rhetorical question "whether it was
reasonable to expect a developing country .. .to risk its political, economic and sodal
stability in order to obtain possible advantages whose value might yet prove to be negligible." U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.5/36/Add.4 (mimeograph).
.
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Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, while the United States held out
benefits for Latin America-all under the guise of a general preference
plan. As Bulgaria perceptively noted:
We come across such forms of words as system of generalized
preferences, generalized preferences, generalized system of preferences and generalized preferences. We do not insist on any
textual changes now, but understand that all formulations used
118
have in mind the individual submissions.
v. Implementation. The EEC plan went into effect unilaterally on
July 1, 1971 and was to remain in effect for only one-half year on an
experimental basis. 119 One major feature, not included in its UNCTAD
II proposal, was added-the burden of accepting goods with given
margins of preference under a ceiling arrangement was to be shared on
a percentage basis among the individual EEC states. 20 Since the United
States has not adopted the plan, but instead raised tariffs generally
under the ten percent import surcharge, the EEC still dominates the
preference field. By adding UNCTAD II preferences to those of the
association, if only on a trial basis, the EEC has expanded its system
to all of the less-developed countries, including Latin America.
Latin American countries, which had expected to benefit in major
fashion from the United States preference system, instead faced the
import surcharge for more than four months. Although their benefits
under the EEC plan are limited by the freeze-in provisions of the ceilings and by the priorities given to associates, they ironically are receiving more special trade benefits from the EEC than from the United
States.
The United States response to general preferences involved a competition strategy-an attempt to weaken the EEC trade preference
system by bidding for the affiliation of old or potential associates to
join its own preference system by offering lower tariffs. The success of
this strategy depended on offering inducements on a comparatively
118 U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.5/36,

Annex II (mimeograph) (emphasis added). Some coun-

tries were caught in the crossfire. Nigeria, for example, would not have received preferences from the EEC or the United States on cocoa powder, paste, butter, groundnut oil,
palm oil, veneer sheet, plywood, or petroleum products. U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.5/36/Add.5,
Annex I (mimeograph). These products were evidently excluded from the EEC list because of the demands of the eighteen African states and from the United States list
because the products were the subject of EEC special preferences.
119 The plan as adopted by the EEC appears at L 142 E.E.C. J.O. 1 (1971). See also
L 146 E.E.C. J.O. 1-43 (1971); C 63 E.E.C. J.O. 1 (1971). GATT has approved a general
waiver under article XXV of the Agreement for the general preference plan. GATT,
Press Release No. 1082, June 26, 1971.
120 L 142 E.E.C. J.O. 2 (1971).
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favorable basis, but this was not possible given the attractiveness of
the EEC market and the speculative nature of benefits contingent on
congressional approval. Perhaps realizing that the competitive strategy
would fail, the United States turned to other policy alternatives.
3. Preferences for Latin America. Even if the United States could
not hope to attract preference recipients away from the EEC, the alternative was open to establish its own trade preference system limited
principally to Latin America, a possibility which was raised by the
United States at the close of the UNCTAD II meeting.1 21 When the
EEC announced its July 1, 1971 target date for the implementation of
its general preference plan,' 22 the United States apparently felt compelled to proceed with its own plan tailored to the needs of Latin
America. Thus, in an April, 1971 speech before the Geneva Assembly
of the Organization of American States, Sec. of State William P. Rogers
stated that congressional authorization would be sought for preferences
1
on five hundred products requested by Latin American countries. '
With the imposition of the surcharge, however, all plans to introduce
the enabling legislation ceased. From the point of view of the United
States, a preference system with Latin America would have been at
best a holding action which could not lead to the elimination of the
EEC preference system. The United States turned instead to a strategy
of retaliation designed to affect the EEC where the United States had
more leverage-in the market it provided for EEC exports.
II.

IMPOSITION OF THE SURCHARGE:

THE

STRATEGY OF RETALIATION

On August 15, 1971 President Nixon proclaimed a ten percent surcharge on all imports, subject to certain exemptions. 12

4

Its general

121 The United States stated that, "if special preferences were maintained by other
countries, the United States reserved the right to exend comparable special preferences."
U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.5/36/Add.4 (mimeograph).
122 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9425 (1971) (press release of the EEC Commission, issued
March 18, 1971).
123 The Secretary said:
The United States Government has decided, in large part because of the consultations within this organization, to include in our own preference system some 500
products requested by Latin American countries. The total value of U.S. imports of
these items from Latin America in 1969 was $650 million.
Action on generalized preferences will require congressional approval. The President has asked me immediately on my return from this meeting to initiate consultations with Members of Congress with a view to early introduction of legislation to
grant to developing countries generalized tariff preferences on a wide range of
products, including the 500 items requested by Latin America. The Administration
will make a concerted effort to secure enactment of this legislation.
64 DEP'r STATE BULL. 602, 604 (1971).
124 Pres. Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (1971). Citations to particular
language in the Proclamation are for convenience made to parts and subparts or to paragraphs.
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purpose, as originally formulated by Treasury Sec. John B. Connally,
was to "guarantee" the revaluation of major undervalued foreign
currencies and thus to rectify the United States balance-of-payments
deficit. 1 25 Three conditions were set for removal of the surcharge:
revaluation of currencies, liberalization of specific barriers to trade by
Japan and the EEC, and increased defense burden sharing by United
126
States allies.
On December 20, after the surcharge had been in effect more than
four months, it was removed. 12 7 The removal accompanied a substantial
currency realignment, partially attributable to a commitment by the
United States to devalue the dollar by 8.57 percent,128 and followed a
West German pledge to increase its contribution to NATO arms expenditures by $1 billion. 129 Conspicuously lacking in the settlement
were any trade concessions by either the EEC or Japan.
Consideration of the surcharge will proceed in two steps: (1) an
analysis of the relationship between the surcharge and trade preferences
and (2) an examination of the purported legal authority for the surcharge.
A. Effects on Trade Preferences and Policy Alternatives
1. Relation to Trade Preferences.The removal of trade preferences
was one of the major trade concessions that the United States attempted
to secure before removing the surcharge. The question of preferences
was raised in three forums: at the GATT, in the Group of Ten, and in
trade negotiations between the President's Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations and the EEC Commission.
In mid-November, 1971, following the imposition of the surcharge,
the United States began its assault on preferences within the GATT by
125 N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1971, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.); N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1971, at I, col. 8
(city ed.) (statement of Secretary Connally before the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund). See generally Hearings on International Aspects of the President's New Economic Policies Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 101-32 (1971) (testimony of Secretary Connally)
[hereinafter cited as NEP Hearings].
120 See authorities cited note 125 supra. See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1971, at 8, col. I
(city ed.) (statement of Asst. Treasury Sec. Paul A. Volcker before a meeting of the Group
of Ten finance ministers); Wall Street Journal, Dec. 2, 1971, at 3 col. 1 (Midwest ed.)
(report on the Group of Ten meeting).
127 President Nixon announced the removal while meeting with Prime Minister Health
of Britain in Bermuda. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1971, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.). The removal of
the surcharge was effected by Pres. Proclamation No. 4098, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,201 (1971).
128 N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1971, at 53, col. 4 (city ed.). For the new currency parities, see
Wall Street Journal, Dec. 21, 1971, at 3, col. 4 (Midwest ed.).
129 See N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1971, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.) (statement of Lord Carrington,
Chairman of NATO's Eurogroup, consisting of the defense ministers of the member
nations).
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calling attention to the "grave danger" the preference system represented for the most-favored nation principle. 18 0 Particular stress was
placed on the expansion of the system through the negotiations of the
EEC with the free trade area countries not planning to enter the
Common Market: Austria, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. 13 1 The
United States estimated that the new round of preferences would cost
32
$200-$300 million in exports.
Although the United States did not publicly connect the preference
issue with the removal of the surcharge, the implied connection was
not overlooked by the EEC, which rejected the United States proposal
of a GATT statistical study of the effects of preferences 83 and flatly
stated that there would be no discussion of preferences until the surcharge was removed. 18 4
At the first Group of Ten meeting in Rome in late November, 135
Secretary Connally first indicated that the United States might devalue
as part of an exchange rate realignment. 36 This "concession" was
joined with the demand that "tangible progress' 137 on "short-term"
trade issues, 138 including preferences, was a condition for surcharge
removal. Although the preference issue was now joined to the surcharge,
the "tangible progress" and "short-term" criteria indicated that actual
or fundamental changes in the system might not be required.
In the subsequent trade talks between U.S. Special Rep. for Trade
Negotiations William D. Eberle and EEC Commr. Ralf Dahrendorf,
discussion focused on one aspect of the preference system, the citrus
agreements. However, the United States demand that it pay the same
tariff as Spain and Israel, 139 which would have greatly impaired the
130 N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1971, at 41, col. 2 (city ed.) (statement of Herbert F. Propps,

United States negotiator at the GATT).
131 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1971, at 49, col. 4 (city ed.) (statement of Special Rep. for
Trade Negotiations William D. Eberle).
132 N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1971, at 69, col. 2 (city ed.).
133 N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1971, at 59, col. 1 (city ed.). The United States stated that
trade preferences had so proliferated that they had become the rule instead of an exception
to the most-favored nation principle.
134 Id. See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1971, at 43, col. 3 (city ed.).
135 See N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1971, at 95, col. 6 (city ed.) (report on trade preferences).
136 N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1971, at 1, col. 7 (city ed.). This suggestion came in the form
of a "hypothetical" posed by Secretary Connally when he asked the Group what it would
do if the United States devalued the dollar by ten percent.
137 Id.; see N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1971, at 69, col. 2 (city ed.) (statement of Secretary
Connally).
138 N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1971, at 95, col, 6 (city ed.); cf. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1971, at 1,
col. 7 (city ed.).
189 N.Y. Times; Dec. 9, 1971, at 73, col. 1 (city ed.). In one of the few examples of con-

cessions to the United States on the preference issue, the EEC had reduced its tariff from
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value of the association:agreement and put pressure on the preferences
of Tunisia and Morocco,

1 40

was resisted by Commissioner Dahrendorf,

who noted that France had not agreed to a mandate on such issues141
and stated that insistence on trade concessions could endanger agreement on currency realignment. 14
French consent to a mandate was secured only after President Nixon
met with President Pompidou of France in the Azores on December 14,
when the United States announced its intention to devalue as part of
currency realignment. However, no French commitment to grant actual
concessions was obtained. 143 Thus, although Secretary Connally continued to insist on actual concessions, 4 4 other Administration statements hedged between requiring actual concessions 145 and tangible
progress. 146 Moreover, it became clear that devaluation and not surcharge removal would be the condition even for tangible progress' 47
when French Finance Minister Giscard d'Estaing indicated that this
148
was the French understanding of the Azores agreement.
Although a mandate for trade discussions issued, its scope was quite
limited, precluding discussion of the United States demand for an end
to "European special trading privileges" and restricting discussion on
citrus preferences to the possibility of an EEC tariff reduction for the
United States of an amount less than that granted to the Mediterranean
fifteen to eight percent on oranges entering the EEC from June 1 to September 30, 1971,
the period when eighty percent of the United States crop was exported. The reasons for
the concession, which was made on July 27, 1971, before the surcharge was imposed,
remain unclear, as do the effects on the preference agreements with the Mediterranean
states. See 2 CCH Corm. MKT. REP. 9447 (1971). See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1971, at 95,

col. 2 (city ed.).
140 See text at notes 57-58 supra.

N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1971, at 73, col. 1 (city ed.).
N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1971, at 65, col. 1 (city ed.). Commissioner Dahrendorf stated,
"If this is the last word then a realignment of currencies isn't possible."
143 N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1971, at 1, col. 8 (city ed.). The text of the joint statement, in
relevant part, was as follows:
Aware of the interest of measures involving trade for a lasting equilibrium of the
balance of payments, President Pompidou confirmed that France, together with the
Governments of the other countries which are members of the European Economic
Community, was preparing the mandate which would permit the imminent opening
of negotiations with the United States in order to settle the short-term problems currently pending and to establish the agenda for the examination of fundamental
question[s] in the area of trade.
Id. at 48, col. 1.
144 Wall Street Journal, Dec. 16, 1971, at 3, col. 2 (Midwest ed.).
145 Id.
146 N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1971, at 44, col. 1 (city ed.).
147 Compare N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1971, at 61, col. 1 (city ed.) (Treasury Department's
precondition for surcharge removal) with Wall Street Journal, Dec. 16, 1971, at 3, col. 2
(Midwest ed.) (Secretary Connally's precondition for devaluation).
148 N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1971, at 61, col. 1 (city ed.).
141
142
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preference recipients. 14 9 When President Nixon announced agreement
on currency realignment on December 18 at the Washington Group of
Ten meeting, 150 indicated on December 19 that the surcharge would
be removed, 15 1 and effected its removal on December 20,152 neither
actual concessions nor tangible progress had been achieved on preferences or other trade issues.
The United States sought to preserve a bargaining counter for inducement of trade concessions by stating that devaluation-an increase
in the price of gold from thirty-five to thirty-eight dollars per ouncewould not be sought from Congress unless trade concessions were forthcoming. 53 Without an accompanying commitment by the United
States to convert dollars for gold, which is highly unlikely, it is questionable whether this symbolic devaluation will be a sufficient inducement. It seems far more likely that trade issues can be resolved only
through a "Nixon Round" of negotiations in which the United States
will have to make trade concessions of its own to produce any EEC
concessions. 15
Thus, throughout the negotiations for removal of the surcharge, the
EEC displayed unwillingness to make any significant concessions on the
trade preference issue and was able finally to secure removal in exchange
only for currency realignment. Its position changed imperceptibly with
major United States policy changes: following the Rome meeting, the
EEC discussed preferences, but without a mandate even though the
United States had indicated that it might devalue; following the Azores
meeting, at which the United States said it would devalue, France consented to a mandate, but quite narrow in scope; and following the surcharge removal, the EEC pledged only that it would continue to talk.
2. An Explanation of the Failure.The failure of the United States
to obtain trade concessions in exchange for surcharge removal is traceable to two factors: the higher priority the United States placed on
currency realignment and the limited leverage achieved by the imposition of the surcharge.
149 Id. at 61, col. 4.
150 N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1971, at 1, col. 2 (city ed.).

151 Wall Street Journal, Dec. 20, 1971, at 1, col. 6 (Midwest ed.).
152 N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1971, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.).
153 Wall Street Journal, Dec. 20, 1971, at 1, col. 6 (Midwest ed.). In announcing the
removal of the surcharge, President Nixon implied that some agreements on trade had
been reached: "This first step having been taken, we can now move on to the trade areas
and the monetary areas in which agreement was also reached over the weekend." N.Y.
Times, Dec. 21, 1971, at 53, col. 4 (city ed.). This seems to be an overstatement, however,
since it was reported that Secretary Connally was trying to enlist British support "for
help" to persuade the EEC to end restrictive trade practices such as preferences. This
initiative implies that no agreement had yet been reached.
154 Cf. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 20, 1971, at 3, col. 2 (Midwest ed.).
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The priority that the United States put on currency realignment was
clear from the manner in which it pursued negotiations-first seeking
currency realignment and then seeking trade concessions. 15 5 This priority is justified by the disparity in the values of currency and trade
adjustment. A weighted eleven percent revaluation of foreign currencies would produce an $8.8 billion improvement in the United States
balance of payments, according to an International Monetary Fund
formula,'5 6 whereas the loss from trade preferences would probably be
less than $1 billion.157 Moreover, the $1 billion figure is included in
the balance-of-payments adjustment since prior imbalances are attributable in part to these preferences.
The leverage achieved by the imposition of the surcharge inhered
in the ability of the United States to inflict trade losses on other countries, which in turn could cause unemployment in the export sector
and occasion political demands in those countries to comply with
United States demands. Thus, after the surcharge was imposed the
Japanese Ministry of Trade estimated that the combined effect of the
surcharge and the appreciation of its exchange rate could lead to a
$2.4 billion loss in trade.5 8 Similarly, an EEC study concluded that its
$2 billion trade surplus would be eliminated.'5 9 European authorities
also feared that the surcharge would contribute to a recession.' 6 0 An
EEC report stated that, at a minimum, "United States policy will
161
aggravate a situation already deteriorating."'
This potential leverage was, nevertheless, limited by a number of
factors. First, the surcharge in combination with the dosing of the gold
window could not easily produce realignment of exchange rates.
Foreign governments could stop such adjustment through exchange
controls, typified by the French two-tier system, or through market
155 The trade issue began to surface only in late November or early December, 1971,
after there had been an appreciable float in currency rates-particularly the mark and
the yen-and after the United States had indicated that it would "contribute" to realignment by devaluing the dollar. The timing of the monetary and trade issues is another
indication of their relative priorities.
'56 N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1971, at 63, col. 1 (city ed.).
157 This figure is based on the fact that $750 million in present United States exports

compete with goods receiving trade preferences and that an additional $200-$300 million
would be affected by entry of the European free trade area states into preference agreements. See notes 45, 131 supra.
158 N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1971, at 61, col. I (city ed.).
159 N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1971, at 29, col. 1 (city ed.).
160 Thus, Italian authorities reported that production was off seven percent and that
prices were up seven percent. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1971, at 59, col. 1 (city ed.). German
business leaders were also extremely concerned about economic prospects. N.Y. Times, Oct.
26, 1971, at 59, col. 3 (city ed.).
181 N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1971, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.).
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intervention. 62 Although the surcharge contributed to pressure on governments, a decision to allow revaluation through an upward float
would only intensify such pressure since the prices of exports would
increase by ten percent plus the appreciation of the currency. Since the
surcharge could not easily produce currency realignment, the United
States was forced to limit the conditions for its removal to such realignment.
Second, the longer the surcharge remained, the greater was the
pressure on foreign countries to retaliate by imposing their own trade
restrictions. Thus, Canada threatened to subsidize partially its export
industry16 3 and Denmark imposed a ten percent surcharge of its own. 164
Although the EEC did not retaliate, there were continuous low-level
threats that it might do so. As Commisioner Dahrendorf put it, "If the
American surcharge remains in effect, there will be great pressure from
certain industries and trade unions to apply protectionist measures."' 16 5
Third, to obtain maximum leverage, the Nixon Administration was
required to make it credible that the surcharge could be removed in
the face of protectionist demands that it be made permanent.' 66 Such
credibility was likely to decrease over time as companies raised prices
to levels which were competitive only while the surcharge was in effect.
This possibility was minimized to some extent, however, by the Price
Commission's allowance of price increases only to reflect increased
162 Thus, the French did not permit any adjustment of exchange rates on commercial
transactions and instead intervened in the market. N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1971, at 1, col. 2
(city ed.). Only the rates on other transactions in foreign currency, which comprise twentyfive percent of all transactions, were permitted to float. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1971, at 1,
col. 6 (city ed.). This kind of market intervention, especially in the forward market, can
block exchange rate adjustment as long as central banks are willing to absorb United
States dollars. Cf. P. EINzIG, FOREIGN EXCHANGE CIsIs 147-48 (2d ed. 1970).
163 N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1971, at 1, col. 3 (city ed.).
164 N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1971, at 73, col. 1 (city ed.). This response was significant from
a political viewpoint in that it was adopted by the newly elected Social Democrats in their
first day in office. The less-developed countries were exempted from coverage.
165 N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1971, at 45, col. 1 (city ed.).
166 Indeed, some members of Congress seemed to view the purpose of the surcharge as
protection of American industries rather than achievement of trade liberalization or exchange rate adjustment. They preferred that the surcharge be permanent. NEP Hearings,
supra note 125, at 12-13 (remarks of Sen. Paul Fannin). Most members of industry viewed
the surcharge in the same manner. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1971, H.R. 10947,
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (testimony of automobile
dealers representative at 117, steel industry representative at 334-35, machine tool industry representative at 418). See also N.Y, Times, Nov. 16, 1971, at 65, col. 2 (city ed.)
(statement of Undersec. of State for Economic Affairs Nathaniel Samuels before the Fiftyeighth National Foreign Trade Convention indicating that protectionist forces would
become irresistible unless there were a balance-of-payments correction through currency
realignment).
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costs' 67 and the consequent apparent exclusion of surcharge-related
increases. Thus, in the auto industry, which was given a more than
20 percent margin of protection through a surcharge of 10 percent and
the float of the yen and mark of more than 10 percent, price increases
16 8
ranged from 2.5 to 4.5 percent.
Fourth, the leverage of the surcharge was limited by its bluntnessit was to be applied to and removed from all countries at the same time
since the Administration opposed more selective use.1 69 This policy had
the effect of limiting the leverage of the surcharge against all countries
to its leverage against that country against which it had the least leverage. Thus, even if Japan might have granted trade concessions as well
as adjusted exchange rates, it might have anticipated that France would
only adjust rates and demand surcharge removal directly thereafter.
Once France agreed, the surcharge would have been removed from all
countries regardless of the fact that more concessions might have been
obtained from Japan.
Fifth and most important, the United States could not have effectively removed the surcharge from any given EEC member even if it
had desired to do so. When the United States hinted that it would remove the surcharge from Germany because it had allowed its currency
to appreciate, the EEC collectively viewed this possibility as a divideand-conquer strategy and resisted it.170 Thus, France, whose minimal

trade with the United States and independence from NATO made it
least susceptible to surcharge leverage 1 and consequently least likely
to favor trade concessions to remove the surcharge, blocked the possibility of meaningful trade negotiations,
These limiting factors resulted in the failure of the retaliatory
strategy, at least as it related to trade. As suggested previously, one
might view the correction of the imbalance of payments as compensating for the loss of trade. Two major differences between the two alterPrice Commission Regulations subpt. A, § 300.12, 36 Fed. Reg. 21,792 (1971).
9934. American Motors and General Motors were
granted 2.5 percent price increases; Ford, 2.9 percent; and Chrysler, 4.5 percent.
169 The reason for not adopting a more selective application remains unclear. The
premise of across-the-board application was supplied by President Nixon in his speech
announcing the imposition of the surcharge: "The import tax is a temporary action. It
isn't directed against any other country." 65 DEP'T STATE BULL. 253, 255 (1971). The principle of nonselectivity becomes more difficult to understand in light of the fact that the
actions of only a very few countries affected the removal of the surcharge.
170 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1971, at 61, col. 3 (city ed.); N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1971, at 73,
col. 2 (city ed.).
171 Four percent of French exports were to the United States. This represented less
than one percent of the French gross national product. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1971, at 91,
col. 2 (city ed.).
167
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natives exist, however. First, the new currency rates will generally
benefit United States exporters and domestic producers, whose goods
will become more competitive with higher-priced imports. Trade concessions, on the other hand, would have benefited specific exporters
who are discriminated against. These exporters, moreover, will not
benefit from the currency realignment since trade measures such as the
variable levy used by the EEC can nullify the price advantage resulting
from revaluation of foreign currencies. 172 This points to the second
major difference. Elimination of trade discrimination would have produced a long-run adjustment in the trade balance, whereas the fixedrate currency realignment will compensate only temporarily for trade
discrimination until a future realignment occurs.
3.Significant Costs. Three significant costs of the surcharge policy
are of importance: the breaking of international legal obligations by
the United States, the negative reaction of the less-developed countries,
and the probability of a more suspicious attitude by the EEC toward
the United States in the future.
In order to apply the surcharge, the United States was obliged to
violate the two principal international agreements regulating trade
and monetary policy-the GATT and the International Monetary
Fund Agreement. 73 The concern here is primarily with the GATT.
The United States sought to justify its surcharge under article XII
of the GATT, which permits a contracting party, subject to a number
of restrictions, to "safeguard its external financial position and its
balance of payments [by] restrict[ing] the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported ... ." After GATT review, it was determined that this article could not justify the surcharge because it
envisioned only quantitative restrictions, and not the withdrawal of
tariff concessions, as an appropriate response to balance-of-payments
problems. According to the Working Party, the United States argument
172 Thus, the levy can be raised to a new level to continue to keep out United States
exports when local EEC prices are lower than the support price. See Dam, supra note 58,
at 217. The EEC planned to make this adjustment and rejected United States demands
that the levy be frozen at its prerealignment rate. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1971, at 67,
col. 1 (city ed.) (statement of Sicco Mansholt, Chief Farm Specialist of the EEC).
173 The Agreement, known as the Bretton Woods Agreement, requires member countries to establish par values for their currencies based on gold or on the United States
dollar of specified gold content. Fluctuations from par in the spot market must be within
one percent of the fixed rate. International Monetary Fund Agreement, July 22, 1944,
art. IV, § 3(i), 60 Stat. 1401 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1501 (effective Dec. 27, 1945). Changes in par
values must be made after consultation with the Fund and only to correct a "fundamental
disequilibrium" (an undefined term). Id. art. IV, §§ 5(a)-(b). The United States demanded
that certain governments not fix their rates at past parities and instead encouraged shortterm floating, the opposite of a fixed-rate system.
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that a surcharge is less damaging to world trade than are quantitative
restrictions was not sufficient justification for raising tariffs. 174
The GATT was especially concerned with the effects of the surcharge
on the less-developed countries. It concluded that, "in spite of the
exemption of many raw materials and primary products normally
exported by them, the import surcharge significantly affected the export
interest of developing countries." Pursuant to this conclusion, the
Working Party indicated its desire that the United States explore the
possibility of exemptions for such countries. 175 This indicates that
GATT approval or reservation of judgment would have been more
likely had the United States raised tariffs on a selective basis.
Latin America, the less-developed area of greatest interest to the
United States, reacted strongly against the imposition of the surcharge. 7 6 Although the surcharge affected only 19.7 percent of its
exports, it applied to those semi-manufactured and processed goods
critical to any long-term improvement in Latin America's trade position.177 Mexico, for example, one of the more developed of the Latin
American countries, had 38 percent of its exports covered by the
surcharge. 78 Moreover, not only were many Latin American exports
subject to additional duties in their principal market, but also the
trade preferences which they were promised did not materialize. Nevertheless, the Administration refused to exempt Latin America from the
79
surchargeY.
The disaffection of Latin American countries with United States
trade policy is reflected in a new series of trade negotiations between
the EEC and Latin America. In November, 1971, the EEC was in the
process of concluding a three-year trade agreement with Argentina,
had begun negotiating with Uruguay, and was expected to open negotiations with Brazil. 0° Moreover, as previously indicated, Latin Amer174 The United States notified GAIT of the imposition of the surcharge on August 16,
1971. GATT, Press Release No. 1087 (Aug. 16, 1971). GATT then established the Working
Party to examine the compatibility of the surcharge with the Agreement. GATT, Press
Release No. 1088 (Aug. 26, 1971). Its conclusions were issued in GATT, Press Release
No. 1090 (Sept. 16, 1971).
175 GATT, Press Release No. 1090 (Sept. 16, 1971). During the GATT review, the EEC
reserved its right to claim reparations for the United States action, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25,
1971, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.), and the less-developed countries requested exemption, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 26, 1971, at 32, col. 1 (city ed.).
176 N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1971, at 47, col. 2 (city ed.).
177 N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1971, at 25, col. 1 (city ed.) (statement of Under Secretary

Samuels).
178

117 CoNG. REc. S18,485 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1971) (remarks of Sen. James Buckley).

179 N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1971, at 8, col. 5 (city ed.) (statement of Asst. Sec. of State for

International Affairs Charles A. Meyer).
180 N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1971, at 69, col. 2.

The University of Chicago Law Review[

[39,-17-7

ican countries were already participating in the EEC's general preference plan. 81
Finally, the EEC is likely to regard United States objectives with
increasing suspicion. Many European leaders suspect that the United
States no longer views the EEC's economic strength in strictly positive
terms. 8 2 Particular suspicion was roused by such divide-and-conquer
aspects of United States policy as the hint of selective removal of the
surcharge. Moreover, the United States interest in dismantling preferences is being viewed increasingly in political terms. Thus, Commissioner Dahrendorf viewed the demand for elimination of the citrus
preferences as an attack on the political interests of the EEC in the
Mediterranean, stating, "We feel we have the responsibility there that
the United States has in the rest of the world."'1 3 An even stronger
view was taken by Commr. Sicco Mansholt, who stated, "We do more
with our preferences than six, seven or even eight fleets in the Mediterreanean."'' 8 4 One suspects that this cost was unavoidable if the United
States was to make any meaningful trade demands. The pressure
tactics associated with the surcharge policy, however, intensified the
EEC reaction.
4. A Policy Alternative. If the United States were committed to employ a retaliatory policy, it might have adopted a selective and measured
response against major trading countries and the EEC by gradually
increasing tariff rates until its objectives had been achieved. This policy
would have been just as likely, to produce monetary realignment as
would an across-the-board surcharge because it would have been addressed to those countries whose exchange rates were undervalued. It
would, moreover, have had the following advantages over the surcharge: (1) it would have avoided opposition from the less-developed
countries-in fact, since tariffs of most developed countries would
have been raised, it would have constituted a comparative trade preference; (2) since the tariff would have been gradually increased and
selectively applied, it would have minimized the protection of American industries; (3) it might have been approved by GATT; and (4) it
could have been removed selectively, thus increasing its leverage on
countries other than those within the EEC.
The only additional cost of such a policy might have been trade
diversion resulting from discriminatory rates. This possibility would
181 See text at note 119 supra.
182 Frankel, U.S. and Common Market: Doubt, Suspicion, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1971, at
8, col. I (city ed.).
183

N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1971, at 61, col. 4 (city ed.),

184 Id.
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have been minimized, however, due to the difference in goods exported
by the developed and less-developed countries and the short-term duration of the policy.
Finally, as will next be demonstrated, the policy of selective retaliation was the only one that the President had the legal authority to
undertake. The surcharge policy represented a fundamental disregard
by the Nixon Administration for the limitations on presidential power
established by Congress and thus carried with it an institutional cost
as well.
B. Authority for Imposition of the Surcharge
The United States response to EEC trade preferences did not rest
on the authority of domestic statutory law until the imposition of the
surcharge. Thus, challenges under the GATT only assumed that the
EEC was bound by the Agreement, 8 5 and its own preference policies
assumed that new legislation would be needed." 6
The surcharge, on the other hand, was effected by a Presidential Proclamation providing for withdrawal of up to ten percent of prior tariff
concessions granted in trade agreements. 8 7 Its operation can be understood by an examination of the hypothetical situation illustrated in
table 1.
TABLE 1

E

ar OF THE SURCHARGE ON TARiFF RATES
(by percent)

Product

Trade Agreement
Rate

Statutory
Rate

Rate after
Surcharge

A
B
C
D

20
20
20
20

40
0
25
20

30
so
25
20

In the case of product A, where the size of the concession (the difference between the trade agreement rate and the statutory rate) is twenty
185 Whether the United States is bound by the GATT is not, therefore, at issue. Cf.
Jackson, The GATT in U.S. Domestic Law, 66 Mici. L. Ray. 249 (1967).
186 See text at note 123 supra.
187 Pres. Proclamation No. 4074, pt. B(2), 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724-25 (1971), provides in
relevant part:
Such proclamations [those granting concessions under trade agreements] are suspended
only insofar as is required to assess a surcharge in the form of a supplemental duty

amounting to 10 percent ad valorem

. ..-

provided, however, that if the imposition of

an additional duty of 10 percent ad valorem would cause the total duty or charge
payable to exceed the total duty or charge payable at the rate prescribed in column 2
of the
Tariff
Schedules of the United States [the statutory rate], then the column 2
rate
shall
apply.
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percent, ten of the twenty percent may be suspended. For product B,
where the concession is ten percent, the entire concession may be suspended. For product C, where the concession is five percent, only a
five percent concession may be suspended. And for product D, on
which no previous concession was granted, the tariff must remain
unchanged. Thus, the tariff may be increased by ten percent above the
trade agreement rate or statutory rate, whichever is lower. Operationally, it should be clear that raising rates from their present level or
suspending prior concessions are equivalent acts-two sides of the same
coin.
The Proclamation delegates to the Secretary of the Treasury the
power to make certain exemptions to the above principles. It provides:
The Secretary may from time to time take action to reduce, eliminate or reimpose the rate of additional duty herein or to establish
exemption therefrom, either generally or with respect to an article
which he may specify either generally or as the product of a particular country, if he determines that such action is consistent with
safeguarding the balance of payments position of the United
8
8

States.1

This power was used to exempt goods for which no duty was paid prior
to the imposition of the surcharge, goods imported subject to tariff
quotas, and goods already in stock when the surcharge was imposed. 189
The Proclamation purports to base authority for the action on the
powers given the President "by the Constitution and the statutes, including but not limited to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 . . . ."10 The central proposition advanced in this part of the comment is that the imposition of the surcharge by the President was illegal in that the act exceeded his constitutional and statutory authority to raise tariffs. This authority, it
188 Id. subpt. C(4)(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 15,725.
189 See 36 Fed. Reg. 16,597 (1971) (exempting articles imported before 12:01 A.M.,
August 16, 1971); 36 Fed. Reg. 17,057 (1971) (exempting certain meats (item numbers
106.10, 106.20 of Tariff Schedules of the United States, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970)) and items
subject to import quotas under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 624 (1970); under the Sugar Act of 1948, 7 U.S.C. § 1100 et seq. (1970); under section
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1970) (this section allows
quotas to be imposed on items whose unlimited importation threaten the national security
and applies presently to oil); and pursuant to the Long-Term International Cotton
Textile Agreement, 33 Fed. Reg. 582 (1968)). Moreover, all articles which were duty-free
before the imposition of the surcharge were exempted because the surcharge applied only
to "dutiable" items. Pres. Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (1971). See also
Explanatory Material of the White House Press Secretary, Aug. 15, 1971, in CCH 1971
ECONOMIC COTROLS
5005.
190 Pres. Proclamation No. 4074, para. 5, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,725 (1971).
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will be argued, is restricted to those cases in which tariffs are raised in
response to significant discriminatory actions by other countries against
United States exports. The surcharge cannot be such a response since
it applies to the exports of all countries, not merely those which have
taken discriminatory action.
1. ConstitutionalAuthority. If the phrasing of the surcharge authority was intended to indicate that the Constitution gives the President
power to set tariffs without congressional authority, the conclusion is
clearly wrong. The Constitution vests in Congress the power "to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imports and excises" and "to regulate commerce with foreign nations." 191 Pursuant to this power, Congress has
historically exercised legislative authority over the entire field of foreign trade regulation, including the imposition of tariffs. 19 2 Prior to

the passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Congress established
the tariff rates itself. 93 Since that date Congress has delegated to the
President the power to set tariffs, but only within given guidelines.
The Supreme Court has approved this delegation of power with the
proviso that Congress provide a standard to govern the exercise of
Presidential discretion. 94 As Chief Justice Taft stated in Hampton
& Co. v. United States, 9 5 "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix
such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." Even with proper delegation, however, if the President should violate the guidelines, his act would be
without authority and unconstitutional. 9 6 If the statutes could be
191 U.. CONsr. art. I, §

8.

192 See K. MACKENZIE, TARIFF-MAKING AND TRADE POLICY IN THE US. AND CANADA 1-33
(1968); S.D. MEMER, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND TME KENNEDY ROUND 11-18 (1964). See generally F.W. TAUssIG, THE TARIFF HSORY OF THE UNrrw STATES (8th ed. 1931).
193 S.D. MErzcER, supra note 192, at 12-14.
194 K. MACKENZIE, supra note

192, at 5-7 and cases cited therein.
195 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1927).
106 Falcon Sales Co. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 97 (Cust. Ct. 1961); United States v.
Schmidt Pritchard & Co., 47 C.C.P.A. 152, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 919 (1960). Neither the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief nor his unique executive powers includes the
power to make law. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US. 579 (1952). "The
President's order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a manner
prescribed by Congress-it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner
prescribed by the President." Id. at 588. That the order itself set out the President's reasons for adopting his policy was taken as indicative of its attempt to achieve statutory
status.
Where rule making pursuant to a law delegating power ends and law making by the
President begins is an issue about which opinions vary greatly, and since Youngstown the
Supreme Court has accordingly sought nonconstitutional grounds on which to dispose of
cases raising the question. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958). Compare
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interpreted to authorize the surcharge' then they might themselves be
challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of authority. 197 As a review of the statutes will indicate, one or the other of these consequences follow from the imposition of -the surcharge.
2. Statutory Authority. As indicated in the Proclamation, the statutory authority for the surcharge is based on two legislative enactments:
section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,'9 8 and the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962.199 Each enactment contains a number of provisions empowering the President to raise tariffs, some of which overlap.
The following analysis will be restricted to those provisions which
offer colorable justification for the surcharge.20 0 The first set of proviArizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626-27 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part), with
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 2 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) and United States v. Sharpnack,
355 U.S. 286, 297 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
197 If the statute is construed as authorizing the imposition of the surcharge by the
President, the possibility that the statute unconstitutionally delegates that power must be
considered. Professor Davis suggests that the nondelegation doctrine has little current
vitality: "The vaguest of standards are held adequate, and various delegations without
2.01, at 76
standards have been upheld." 1 K.C. DAvis, ADMINISrRATIvE LAW TRaATisE
(1958). The only two cases in which congressional delegations to public authorities were
held invalid, he argues, rested on special factors not likely to recur. A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (excessively broad delegation); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (exceptional executive disorganization). Professor Jaffe, reaching much the same conclusion, notes that "not a single judge of the Court
. . . has ever suggested that there are no limits on the power to delegate." L. JAFFE,
ACTION 68 (1965). Extreme circumstances, such as
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIV.
"a new depression," might force the issue, he suggests. Id. at 72.
Neither the case law nor the commentaries, however, speaks meaningfully to the delegation said to be involved in the power to impose the surcharge, Imposition is essentially a
discrete action, complete in itself. It is not elaborated by individual decisions and interpretations any more than would the same decision made directly by Congress. Rather than
focusing on the due process issues typically involved in disputed delegations, therefore,
attention must be confined here to the separation-of-powers issue. The general principle
that power is reposed by the Constitution in a particular branch of government must, of
course, be reconciled with modern realities. But is it possible to argue that the President
must be able to respond to both aggression and economic trends with similar dispatch?
198 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1970), formerly ch. 474, § 1, 48 Stat. 943 (1934). The amended
version delegated certain authority to the President to enter into trade agreements and
-make concessions thereunder or 'to raise rates. It will hereinafter be referred to as section
350(a) of the Tariff Act. For the legislative history of the 1934 amendment, see Sayre, The
Cntitutionality of The Trade Agreements Act, 39 COLUM. L. Ray. 751 (1939); Note, The
Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 46 YALE L.J. 647 (1937).
199 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1970).
200 Three provisions of the Act-sections 201, 232, and 351, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1862,
1981 (1970)--seem clearly inapplicable. Under section 201(a)(2), entitled "Basic Authority for Trade Agreements," the President, whenever he "determines that any
existing duties or other import restrictions of any foreign country or the United States
are unduly burdening," may raise tariffs by proclamation "as he determines to be required
or appropriate to carry out any such trade agreement." The surcharge cannot, however,
be said to be "appropriate to carry out a trade agreement" but rather does just the
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sions which meets this requirement is section 350(a) of the Tariff Act 20 1
and section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act. 20 2 Both deal with the
power of the President to respond to discriminatory trade measures.
a. Section 350(a): Selective retaliation. Section 350(a) of the Tariff
Act was added by amendment in 1934. It provides:
[T]he President, whenever he finds as as a fact that any existing
duties or other import restrictions of the United States or any foreign country are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign
trade of the United States and that the purpose above declared
will be promoted by the means hereinafter specified, is authorized
from time to time(A) To enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign governments or instrumentalities thereof ...
(B) To proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other
import restrictions or such continuance, and for such minimum
periods, of existing customs or excise treatment of any article covered by foreign trade agreements, as are required or appropriate
to carry out any foreign trade agreement that the President has
entered into hereunder.
opposite by suspending the provisions of trade agreements. The section would more
appropriately be used to reinstate concession rates. Hearings on HR. 9900 Before the
House Comm. on Ways & Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3871-72 (1962) (statement of Under
Sec. of State George Ball) [hereinafter cited as 1962 House Hearings]. See also NEP Hearings, supra note 125, at 24.
Under section 232, entitled "Safeguarding National Security," following an investigation by the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) which determines that the
importation of a certain good in certain quantities may impair the national security, the
President "shall take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the
imports of such article and its derivatives ...." The scope of this section on its face can
apply only to a limited number of imported items, such as petroleum. The surcharge,
on the other hand, applies to many items which even the most dedicated protectionist
would find difficult to argue were impairing the national security. Moreover, action by the
President under this section requires a fact finding by the OEP Director, which clearly
was not made in this case. See 1962 House Hearings,supra at 766-67.
Under section 351, pursuant to a finding by the Tariff Commission under section 301,
19 U.S.C. § 1901 (1970), that "as a result in major part of concessions granted under trade
agreements, an article is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities
as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to the domestic industry producing an
article which is like or directly competitive with the imported article." The President
may increase tariffs on the threatening goods. This provision is aimed at injury to
domestic producers and not harm to the export industry, as is the case with trade
preference systems and nontariff barriers, and thus seems not to apply to the imposition
of the surcharge. Moreover, no petition has been addressed to the Tariff Commission to
make such a finding on every article imported into the United States. See also U.S. Tariff
Comm'n, Rules of Practice and Procedure, 27 Fed. Reg. 12,117 (1962).
201 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1970).
202 19 U.S.C. § 1882 (1970).
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In examining the legislative history of this provision, two general
background points should be noted. First, although Congress did consider in detail the limitations that the amendment would place on
presidential action, its consideration was'prompted more by the fear
that the President would lower rates rather than raise them.20 3 Nonetheless, the limitations on the power to raise accompanied the limitations on the power to lower tariffs. 20 4 Second, whether a surcharge
could be imposed was not discussed at all.
The essential provision of section 350(a) is that the President may
raise tariffs "whenever he finds as a fact any existing duties or other
import restrictions of ... any foreign country are unduly burdening
and restricting" United States trade. Thus, a foreign restriction and
the undue burden were factual preconditions to and limitations on the
exercise of presidential power.
The limiting features of this provision were quite apparent to Congress during consideration of the amendment. The House Report called
foreign restrictions a "definite criterion" for presidential action. 205 And,
as Sen. Frederick Steiwer stated in the final Senate debate, only after
a finding of foreign restrictions is made may the President act. More203 This arose from the fact that the main purpose of the bill was to give the President
the authority to enter into trade agreements through which tariff rates would be lowered

and trade expanded. As Sec. of State Cordell Hull stated: "[it is manifest that unless the
Executive is given authority to deal with the existing great -emergency somewhat on a
parity with that exercised by the executive departments of so many other governments
for purposes of negotiating and carrying into effect trade agreements, it will not be
practicable or possible for the United States to pursue with any degree of success the
proposed policy of restoring our lost international trade." Hearings on H-R. 8430 Before
the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1934) [hereinafter cited as

1934 House Hearings]. See

also MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: RE-

QUEST TO AUTHORIZE THE EXECUTIVE TO ENTER INTO ExEcnrlvE COMMI?.ERcIAL AGREPMIENTS

NATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 273, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). Throughout consideration of this bill, congressmen expressed concern over the possible impact of these
lower rates on domestic industries. See 1934 House Hearings, supra at 73. Robert Lincoln
O'Brien, Chairman of the Tariff Commission, stated: "[S]ince there seems to be no worry
about the President's use of that power in raising tariffs, I will direct my remarks wholly
to the President's use of the power ... in lowering rates." Id.
204 One of the central issues during consideration of the legislation was whether Congress could delegate any power to the President to set tariff rates. See H.R. REP. No. 1000,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The opponents of delegated power to lower rates found it
difficult to support their position when they thought delegated power to raise rates was
permissible. See 78 CoNG. REG. 5345 (1934) (exchange between Reps. Samuel B. Hill and
Harold Knutson).
205 H.R. REP. No. 1000, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1934). See also 1934 House Hearings,
supra note 203, at 293-302 (statement of Asst. Sec. of State Francis B. Sayre); Hearings on
H.R. 8687 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1934) [hereinafter
cited as 1934 Senate Hearings].
WITH FOREIGN
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over, he stated, not all restrictions would permit presidential action, but
only those "unduly burdening" to American trade.20 6
The limits within which presidential power was confined are made
even clearer by one of the major amendments to the Senate bill. As
introduced by the Administration in the House, the bill had provided
that the President might act "whenever he finds that any existing duties
or other import restrictions are unduly burdening and restricting the
foreign trade of the United States or that the purpose above declared
[to promote foreign trade] will be promoted by the use of the powers
herein conferred .. ,207The amendment changed the "or" to an
"and" to eliminate what Rep. Emmanuel Celler termed the "basket
clause, '208 which would have served as a very loose control on the authority of the President. 20 9
The circumstances surrounding the surcharge, however, did not meet
the strict factual preconditions which must be met before the President
may act under section 350(a). Although the surcharge was imposed
against all countries, 21 there is no evidence that a finding could reasonably be made that every country had restricted and unduly burdened
United States trade. Under the section, such a finding must be made
on a country-by-country basis since trade restrictions differ among countries.
Although many countries have restrictions on United States trade,21
"..

206 78 CONG. R1EC. 10,203 (1934).
207 H.R. 8430, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (emphasis added).
208 78 CONG. Re. 5558 (1934). Representative Celler said that the original version of

the bill gave
to the Executive the right to modify the existing duties within a 50-percent range.
He has a right to impose import restrictions, he has the right to retaliate upon those
countries which discriminate against American commerce, and as the bill reads "or
for any other reason," which is a sort of basket clause, which increases the power the
President has.
He can do almost anything in his discretion without let or hindrance, and these
powers are to be exercised by Presidential proclamation.
Id.
209 The express purpose of the amendment was to limit presidential power to respond
only to foreign import restrictions. It was suggested for this purpose by James A. Emery
of the National Association of Manufacturers. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 203, at
421; 1934 Senate Hearings, supra note 205, at 294. The Administration supported this
limitation as the only "yardstick" for presidential action. Id. at 99-100 (statement of
Assistant Secretary Sayre). There was no opposition to the amendment on the Senate
floor, and the House concurred in a 154-53 vote, 78 CONG. RIc. 10,636 (1934), with Rep.
Robert Doughton terming the amendment a "limitation of power," id. at 10,628.
210 The "finding of fact" requirement suggests that such a finding should be made
public as an announced reason for presidential action.
211 "Duties and import restriction" are defined broadly in the amendment to section
350(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1351(c)(1) (1970), to include "(A) rate and form of import duties and
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many restrictions cannot reasonably be said to burden United States
trade unduly. For example, a finding by the Presidential Commission
on International Trade and Investment Policy that Sierra Leone imposes quantitative restrictions by requiring specific licenses for a "few
products" and employs an "automobile valuation based on engine size
which discriminates against high horsepower vehicles" 212 can hardly
support the conclusion that a decrease in automobile exports to Sierra
Leone unduly burdens trade. If such a conclusion could be reached by
the President, it would so dilute the factual preconditions in the amendment as to render them meaningless.
Finally, there is no reason to believe from the Proclamation or other
statements of the Administration that the surcharge was based on any
finding of foreign restrictions beyond those of the EEC and major trading nations. Instead, the thrust of Administration justification was the
218
balance-of-payments problem.
b. Section 252: Selective retaliation.The second statutory provision
which relates to foreign restrictions is section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act.2 14 This section, entitled "Foreign Import Restrictions," establishes three different preconditions, each of which arguably allows the
President to raise tariffs by withdrawing prior concessions. One might
assume that this section would be most relevant in seeking a statutory
classification of articles, and (B) limitations, prohibitions, charges, and exactions other
than duties, imposed on importation or imposed for the regulation of imports." This
broad definition could include almost any kind of trade restrictions, perhaps even exchange
controls. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 203, at 20-21 (statement of Secretary Hul).
Thus, it is possible that the President, if a diligent search were made, could document at
least one such restriction for every country in the world. An attempt at such documentation is already available. Pursuant to a recommendation to the President in 1970 to pursue
negotiations to reduce nontariff barriers, the House Ways and Means Committee compiled
an "inventory" of nontariff barriers employed by sixty-nine countries. 1 U.S. COMM'N ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE & INvEsTMENT POLICY, WORKING PAPERs 677 (1971). An inventory
could also be compiled of exchange restrictions. See INTERNAIONAL MONETARY FUND, 21sr
ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE RsnmaroNs (1970). With regard to these restrictions, however, most of which apply not only to the United States but rather to all countries, a
finding of "undue burden" is even more difficult.
212 1 U.S. COMM'N ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE & UNrvERsrrY POLICY, supra note 211, at
695 (1971).
213 Thus, Pres. Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (1971), is entitled "Imposition of Supplemental Duty for Balance of Payments Purposes."
214 The Act was passed primarily in order to authorize the President to enter into trade
discussions with other countries and the EEC for mutual reduction of tariff rates. S.D.
MEaroR, supra note 192, at 17-18. These discussions became known as the "Kennedy
Round." For a study of the history of the negotiations, an analysis of the results, and an
evaluation of implications for future trade policy, see E. PRsnG, TRADEm AND DIPLOMATS
(1970).
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basis for the surcharge, although as will be indicated it does not seem
to be the section on which the drafters of the Proclamation relied.
The three conditions under which the President may act are as follows:
(a) Whenever unjustifiable foreign import restrictions impair the
value of tariff commitments made to the United States, or prevent
the expansion of trade on a mutually advantageous basis ....
(b) Whenever a foreign country or instrumentality the products
of which receive benefits of trade agreement concessions made by
the United States(1) maintains nontariff trade restrictions, including variable
import fees, which substantially burden United States commerce
in a manner inconsistent with provisions of trade agreements, or
(2) engages in discriminatory or other acts (including tolerance
of international cartels) or policies unjustifiably restricting United
States commerce ....
(c) Whenever a foreign country or instrumentality, the products
of which receive benefits of trade agreement concessions made
by the United States, maintains unreasonable import restrictions
which either directly or indirectly burden United States commerce ....
In considering the legislative history of this section, the same points
should be noted that were mentioned respecting section 350(a) of the
Tariff Act-that Congress was more concerned with the power to
lower rates than to raise them 21 5 (this time in anticipation of the
Kennedy Round) and that no consideration was given to a possible
surcharge.
It is clear from the language and legislative history of the Act that
section 252 was not meant to give the President a free hand.2 16 As
215 Indeed, nine volumes of hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee are

filled with the fears of United States industries, often echoed by congressmen. See, e.g.,
Hearings on H.R. 9900 Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 4, at 2343 (1962) (statement of Max Berkowitz, Director of the National Authority
Ladies' Handbag Industry).
216 The limitations were recognized by Congress, 108 CONG. REc. 19,867 (1962) (statement of Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey) and were acknowledged by the Administration,
Hearings on HR. 11970 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4,
at 2233 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Senate Hearings]. Under Secretary
Ball stated that "under section 252 ... we have the power to return to the Smoot-Hawley

tariff by the withdrawal of concessions in cases where they impose an illegal restriction."
Id. Although opponents of the Act, such as Rep. Robert L. F. Sikes, claimed in debate that
no restrictions were placed on presidential power and that the Act represented a "complete
surrender of congressional authority," 108 CoNG. REc. 11,911 (1962), leaders of the op-
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was the case with section 350(a) of the Tariff Act, there were attempts
to broaden the President's power beyond enabling him to respond to
foreign restrictions. Thus, the first version of section 252 in the Administration bill would have allowed the President to withdraw concessions ifother countries engaged in "policies which in his opinion
tend to defeat [the promotion of foreign trade].1 217 The House Ways
and Means Committee scrapped this section entirely and inserted subsections (a) and (b) of present section 252; the Senate added subsection
2 18

(c).

The Senate also added a sweeping provision, section 353,219 which
provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may,
when he finds it in the national interest, proclaim with respect
to any article imported into the United States(1) the increase of any existing duty on such article to such rate
as he finds necessary,
(2) the imposition of a duty on such article (if it is not otherwise subject to duty) at such rate as he finds necessary, and
(3) the imposition of such other import restrictions as he finds
necessary.
This section would have authorized the present surcharge since it
sanctioned any import restrictions that the President might find to be
in the national interest.220 Section 353, however, was subsequently deleted by the Conference Committee, 221 creating a strong presumption
position, such as Sen. Carl T. Curtis of the Finance Committee, recognized that presidential
power had been limited, 108 CONG. R1c. 12,000 (1962).
217 H.R. 9900, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 242 (1962). It provided:
The President shall, when he determines that the purposes of this Act will be
promoted thereby, suspend the reduction or elimination of any duty or other import
restriction provided in any proclamation issued in carrying out any trade agreement
under this title or any predecessor Act to products of any foreign country which
engages in discriminatory treatment of United States commerce or engages in other
acts, including the operations of international cartels, or policies which in his opinion
tend to defeat such purposes.
218 H.R. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1962); S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-3 (1962). Subsection (c) was an amendment to the House bill added in the Senate
Finance Committee, apparently at the urging of Sen. Paul C. Douglas. Cf. 1962 Senate
Hearings,supra note 216, pt. 1, at 168-69.
219 H.R. 11970, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
220 The broad "national interest" standard was emphasized in the Senate debate by
Sen. Harry Byrd, Chairman of the Finance Committee. 108 CONG. REc. 19,570, 19,811
(1962). This point was also stressed by the proponent of the amendment, Sen. Herman E.
Talmadge. 108 CONG. Rc.19,811-12 (1962). Moreover, unlike section 252, section 353
would have allowed rates to be raised beyond the tariff levels of the Smoot-Hawley Act,
108 CONG. REc. 19,810 (1962) (statement of Senator Douglas), and would have allowed
quotas to be imposed, 108 CONG. Rio. 19*,811 (1962) (statement of Senator Byrd).
221 H.R. REP. No. 2518, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1962). It stated: "This amendment adds
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that Congress in passing section 252 wished to withhold such a
222
power from the President.
The three subsections of section 252 impose dear limits on the
situations in which the President may act. Trade restrictions of
foreign countries must either be "unjustifiable 223 or "substantially
burden" 224 United States trade.
It is clear that "unjustifiable" refers to restrictions which would be
invalid under the GATT. As the Administration stated in opposing
deletion of the "unjustifiable" requirement in the Senate Finance Committee,
These amendments would totally disregard the vital distinction
between justifiable and unjustifiable import restrictions. Accordingly, they would require the President to take action against
those import restrictions which are fully recognized and permitted
by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade... and thereby
put us in violation of our international obligations. 225
Many of the countries against which the surcharge was imposed were
not in violation of the GATT 2 26 With respect to these countries, the
presidential action was not authorized by the "unjustifiable" test
of section 252.
a new section to the bill giving the President additional authority to increase tariffs, impose new tariffs on articles not otherwise subject to duty, and impose quotas when he
finds it to be in the national interest. The Senate recedes."
222 The fact that these powers were eliminated does not weaken the conclusion that
Congress also intended to eliminate the "national interest" standard because the Conference Committee could have deleted the quota and tariff-raising provisions while retaining the broad public interest test. Although the deletion was not explained, it is possible that the Administration had urged deletion because it feared that the EEC would
perceive inclusion of such a measure as a threat which might occasion an unwillingness to
engage in measures designed to liberalize trade. Cf. 1962 Senate Hearings, supra note 216,
at 2204-06 (statement of Under Secretary Ball).
223 Section 252(a) requires "unjustifiable foreign import restrictions," section 252(b)(2)
requires acts or poliies "unjustifiably restricting United States commerce," and section
252(c) requires action by the President to have "due regard for the international obligations of the United States."
221 Section 252(a) requires that the restrictions "oppress the commerce of the United
States," section 252(b)(1) requires that they "substantially burden" United States commerce,
and section 252(c) requires that they "either directly or indirectly substantially burden
United States commerce."
225 1962 Senate Hearings, supra note 216, at 1893. The Administration stated additional
reasons for opposing deletion of the "unjustifiable" requirement: "In addition, they
would encourage other countries to disregard the distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable import restrictions and permit them to justify retaliation against our import
restrictions .. . which are either permitted by the GATT or by waivers granted under
the GATT." Id.
226 Most of the disregard for GATT rules seems to come from developed as opposed
to less-developed countries. Cf. Hudec, supra note 55, at 1380-86.
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The "substantial burden" test raises the same obstacles to the surcharge as the "undue burden" test of section 350(a) and may impose
a higher burden since it was aimed primarily at the effects that EEC
restrictions could have on United States trade.22 7 One other issue
respecting this test does arise, however. Subsection (c) requires only
that this burden be "indirect." Yet the legislative history shows that
this requirement refers to the type of situation presented by EEC exclusion of Japanese textiles from its own market, which in turn would
cause a greater influx into United States markets.

228

The effect of the

exclusion, increased Japanese imports into the United States, would
constitute the substantial burden and would allow the President to
respond against the EEC. It should be obvious that very few countries
could present the United States with such a burden.
c. Most-favored nation principle. Despite the apparent prohibition
of a tariff increase on all countries without a finding of discrimination
by each, the argument may be made that the most-favored nation principle requires such a uniform response. If the United States has legitimate cause to retaliate against EEC discrimination and therefore raises
its rates on all articles traded by them, the contention would be that
it must raise the rates on the same articles to all countries in order
to act in a nondiscriminatory fashion. This argument is explicitly
refuted, however, by the language and history of both the Tariff Act
amendment 229 and the Trade Expansion Act.
227 See 108 CONG. REc. 19,810 (1962) (statement of Senator Douglas, who proposed section 252(c)). See also id. at 19,859-60 (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits).
228 S. RaP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1962); 108 CONG. Rac. 19,859-60 (statement
of Senator Javits).
229 The most-favored nation provision of section 350(a) was repealed in 1962 by Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, § 257(b), 76 Stat. 882 (1962), a technical amendment. Section 251
of the Trade Expansion Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (1970), a new statement of the most-favored
nation principle, was made applicable to trade agreements under the authority of both
the Tariff and the Trade Expansion Acts. Before its repeal, section 350(a) provided:
The proclaimed duties and other import restrictions shall apply to articles the
growth, produce, or manufacture of all foreign countries, whether imported directly,
or indirectly: Provided, That the President may suspend the application to articles
the growth, produce, or manufacture of any country because of its discriminatory
treatment of American commerce or because of other acts or policies which in his
opinion tend to defeat the purposes set forth in this section ....
Act of June 12, 1934, § 350(a)(2), ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943.
The only intelligible reading of this language shows a clear exception for the mostfavored nation principle where foreign import restrictions exist. This exception seems
to work in two ways. First, if the United States negotiates lower rates, the new favorable
rates need not be granted to discriminators. Second, and less clear from the language, if
the President has once retaliated by raising rates on particular goods, all rates need not
be raised. The ambiguity in the language arises because the amendment first provides
that "import restrictions" apply to all articles and then states that this "application" does
not apply in cases of discrimination. Were this taken literally, it would mean that if the
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Section 251 of the Trade Expansion Act," ° entitled "Most-Favored
Nation Principle," provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, .. any duty or other
import restriction or duty free treatment proclaimed in carrying
out any trade agreement under this title or section 350 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 shall apply to products of all foreign countries, whether
imported directly or indirectly.
The Senate Report states that "[t]he references in the 'except clause'
make clear, first, that import restrictions imposed under section . . .
252 of title II need not apply to products of all countries . . ." (i.e., if
all products of all countries do not meet the standards of section
252).231 This exception is required by the nature of section 252, which
allows a response only to discrimination. Compulsive most-favored
nation tariff increases would violate the policy of selective retaliation.
d. Section 255: The case for unbridled discretion. Although the
discrimination sections of the Tariff Act amendment and the Trade
Expansion Act would seem to be most relevant in examining the authority for the surcharge, the apparent limitations on the President's
power established by these provisions evidently led the Nixon Administration to seek still other justification. This is clear from the manner
in which the Proclamation attempted to state the authority for the
surcharge: "WHEREAS, under the Tariff Act, the TEA [Trade Expansion Act], and other provisions of law, the President may, at any
time, modify or terminate, in whole or in part, any Proclamation made
under his authority .... -232 This language is derived from section
350(a) of the Tariff Act 233 and a parallel provision of section 255 of
President raised a rate because of discrimination he would not have to apply the raised
rates to discriminators-which would be contrary to the purpose of retaliation. Thus, the
only alternative must be that once the rates are raised the most-favored nation principle
does not apply, and consequently the rates of other nondiscriminators are not raised.

This interpretation is supported by the legislative history. Sen. Byron "Pat" Harrison,
Chairman of the Finance Committee and the principal supporter of the bill, stated:
[T]he privileges granted to each nation are to be applied under the terms of the bill
to all countries alike. To this general policy, however, the proposed legislation makes
certain exceptions. The President may withdraw the enjoyment of such rates from any
country because of its discriminatory treatment of American commerce ....
78 CoNG. R.c. 8988 (1934).
230 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 251, 76 Stat. 879 (codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (1970))

(emphasis added).
232

S. RP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1962).
Pres. Prociamation No. 4074, para. 4, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (1971).

233

19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(6) (1970). It provides: "The President may at any time terminate,

231

in whole or in part, any proclamation made pursuant to this section."
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the Trade Expansion Act. 234 Section 255, entitled "Termination,"

provides:
(a) Every trade agreement entered into under this title shall
be subject to termination or withdrawal, upon due notice, at the
end of a period specified in the agreement. Such period shall be
not more than 3 years from the date on which the agreement becomes effective. If the agreement is not terminated or withdrawn
from at the end of the period so specified, it shall be subject to
termination or withdrawal thereafter upon not more than 6
months' notice.
(b) The President may at any time terminate, in whole or in
part, any proclamation made under this title.
The fundamental question, therefore, is whether the President may
accomplish under section 255(b) what he may not under section 350(a)
of the Tariff Act or section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act.
The Administration claimed that section 255(b) placed "no conditions or qualifications" on the President's authority.235 This claim
234 19 U.S.C. § 1885 (1970). The codified version substitutes "under this subchapter"
for "under this title."
235 NEP Hearings, supra note 125, at 23 (opinion of the General Counsel of the
Treasury, entitled "Legal Basis for the Imposition of the Surcharge'). The opinion relies
solely on this section for justification. Its full argument is as follows:
There are no conditions or qualifications placed on the President's termination
authority under sections 350(a)(6) or 255(b). There is no evidence in the legislative
history either of the Tariff Act or of the TEA that the President's authority to
terminate prior proclamations was to be any less broad than its language would
suggest. On the contrary, the retention of the same unqualified language for almost
forty years although there have been numerous amendments of the trade agreements
authority indicates a Congressional intention to grant to the President broad discretionary power in this area. When originally enacted in 1934 as part of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (48 Stat. 943), the termination authority formed
the concluding sentence of subsection (a)(2) of section 350, and provided: "The President may at any time terminate any such proclamation in whole or in part." Although
Congress frequently amended other provisions of section 350(a) of the Tariff Act, the
termination authority remained unqualified. In 1962, when Congress passed the TEA,
it repealed (section 257(b) of the TEA) portions of section 350(a), but retained the
termination authority as part of the Tariff Act and added the same unqualified
authority to terminate proclamations to the TEA.
In addition, the courts have generally given a broad construction to the President's
termination powers and have refused to imply limitations on these powers. American
Bitumuls and Asphalt Co. et al. v. United States, 44 CCPA 199 (1957, cert, den, 355
U.S. 883 (1957); United States v. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 42 CCPA 38 (1954);
Baer v. United States, 8 Cast. Ct. 104 (1942); and Barclay and Company, Inc. v. United
States, 41 Cust. Ct. 135, C.D. 2031 (1958), affirmed, 47 CCPA 133, C.A.O. 745 (1960).
Thus, the language of the statute, the legislative history and the broad interpretation given to the termination authority by the courts clearly show that the President
had authority under section 350(a)(6) of the Tariff Act and 255(b) of the TEA to

impose the import surcharge.

One can make the following points about this argument: (1) it totally ignores sections
350(a) and 252, which speak directly to withdrawal of trade concessions; (2) the absence
of amendment of these provisions is significant only if one assumes that Congress ever
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has the effect, however, of making the other substantive provisions,
which do condition and qualify presidential power, mere surplusage.
Such an interpretation violates the fundamental principle of statutory
construction that all provisions of a statute must be construed together so as to preserve the meaning of each.
As will be demonstrated, section 255(b) is not a substantive provision at all, but rather a technical and procedural one. This is first
made clear by the use of the word "terminate" rather than the word
"suspend," which is used in section 252. This choice is dictated because section 255(b) speaks only to prior proclamations which are
suspected these provisions did confer unbridled discretion, which Congress never did; and
(3) the cases relied upon constitute no authority for the position taken.
American Bitumuls & Asphalt Co., Metropolitan Petroleum, and Barclay all involved
the termination of a trade agreement with Mexico by Pres. Proclamation No. 2091, 64
Stat. A427; see T.D. 52,559, 85 Treas. Dec. 252 (1950). Since this termination was at the
consent of both parties to the agreement, the authority to terminate was not at issue.
Moreover, the import surcharge did not terminate a trade agreement but rather suspended
a trade concession. The only real issue in the cited cases was whether the termination
raised the tariff rate more than fifty percent in violation of section 350(a)(2), and the
narrow holding was only that the fifty percent limitation does not apply when trade
agreements are terminated.
The Baer case also involved the termination of a trade agreement. The agreement in
question was with Czechoslovakia, applied to Yugoslavia through most-favored nation
treatment, and was terminated in 1939 by President Roosevelt upon the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. The plaintiff importer argued that the termination was ultra vires
in part under section 350(a)(2)(b). The court stated that it could not review presidential
termination of a trade agreement because it is a political act, citing Terlinden v. Ames,
184 U.S. 270 (1902), and that it could review only modification of a trade agreementwhich is the case with the surcharge. The Terlinden citation is completely inapposite. It
held merely that habeas corpus could not be used to question the validity of an extradition treaty on the ground that it had terminated when the foreign signatory state was
consolidated into the German Empire, since that determination was consigned exclusively
to the President. Termination of all trade agreements since 1930 would, of course, result
in the loss of all tariff concessions given to the United States by all countries during that
time. Moreover, under the Trade Expansion Act the authority to terminate trade agreements is contained in section 255(a), not section 255(b).
The contention that under section 350(a) the President may at any time modify a
previous proclamation in order to raise a duty above the level recommended by the
Tariff Commission was rejected in United States v. Schmidt Pritchard & Co., 47 C.C.P.A.
152, cert. denied, 364 US. 919 (1960). The only substantive authority relied on by the
President, section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, was not available as
construed, and consequently the proclamation in that case was held invalid as exceeding
the authority delegated to the President: "The power to terminate his own proclamation
can grant no greater discretion to the President than that under which adjustments are
proclaimed." Id. at 160. Likewise, in Falcon Sales Co. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 97
(Cust. Ct. 1961), the argument that a proclamation purporting to suspend in part earlier
proclamations may be read as terminating them in part was rejected, and the limitation
on presidential power set forth in Schmidt Pritchardwas held applicable to an attempted
suspension.
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terminated, not to the conditions under which tariff rates or trade
agreements are suspended. When a trade agreement concession is withdrawn, the trade agreement is not terminated; rather, particular provisions of that agreement are suspended. It is only the prior proclamation, the function of which is to announce and publish concessions, 230
which is terminated. Thus, the surcharge was viewed as only "temporary," and the Administration did not claim that every trade agreement negotiated since 1934 had been terminated. If this view is
accepted, section 255(b) may be reconciled with section 252. The latter
sets down the conditions under which the President may suspend trade
concessions, while the former enables the President to terminate the
prior proclamation which had made the concession rate effective.
An inadvertent recognition of this difference is revealed by the
reference in the Proclamation to the authority of the President to
"modify or terminate, in whole or in part, any Proclamation made
under his authority." The inclusion of the word "modify," which is
absent entirely from section 255(b), inaccurately attempts to bolster
the claim that section 255(b) is concerned with the power to "suspend"
trade concessions. 237 The drafters of the Proclamation appear to have
been forced into this formulation because section 255(b) as written
238
would not support the action taken.
236 This seems to be the only function of the proclamation. See 1934 House Hearings,
supra note 203, at 860 (statement of Assistant Secretary Sayre).
237 Modification of proclamations by additional proclamations is common. See, e.g.,
Pres. Proclamation No. 3967, 3 C.F.R. §§ 28, 30 (1970). In each case, however, the power
to modify is derived from substantive sections of the relevant legislation. Thus, Pres.
Proclamation No. 3967, supra, drew on the authority of sections 201(a)(2), 203(a)(2)-(3),
and 351(a)(1) of the Trade Expansion Act. On the other hand, the surcharge proclamation, Pres. Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (1971), purports to see the modification "power" as residing in section 255(b), which is not a substantive provision.
238 The view that independent powers are contained in section 255(b) seems explained
in part by accidents of codification which separated the "termination" section from the
substantive sections of the Act. This may be clarified by an examination of statutory

antecedents.
The heritage of section 255(b) can be traced to section 338 of the original Tariff Act,
19 U.S.C. § 1338 (1970), which enables the President to impose additional duties against
foreign discriminators. Section 338 allows the President under various conditions precedent to raise tariff rates by proclamation. Subsection (c), entitled "Application of Proclamation," then provides: "Any proclamation issued by the President under the authority
of this section shall, if he deems it consistent with the interests of the United States,
extend to the whole of any foreign country .. .and the President shall, whenever he
deems the public interests require, suspend, revoke, supplement, or amend any such
proclamation." It is clear from both the language and the placement of this provision
that it establishes no new substantive power to raise rates. It authorizes the President
only to modify a prior proclamation which had raised rates.
Additional proclamation language appeared when section 350(a) of the Act was amended
in 1934. Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 474, § 350(a)(2), 48 Stat. 944. The amendment provision
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What section 255(b) is actually concerned with is the need to avoid
two inconsistent proclamations. The potential for inconsistency arises
in two situations. First, a trade agreement may be negotiated and a
proclamation issued to give notice of the new tariff rates. If at some
later time the President finds that foreign restrictions are unduly
burdening United States trade and withdraws certain concessions
granted in the trade agreement, he must issue another proclamation to
provide notice of the change. In so doing he must terminate "in part"
the prior proclamation which had announced the trade agreement rates.
Second, if at some still later time the President seeks to reinstate the
trade agreement rate, he must issue a third proclamation terminating
"in whole" the second proclamation which had withdrawn the con23 9
cessions.
followed directly after the language limiting the power of the President to raise or lower
rates and to create exceptions to the most-favored nation principle. It provided that "the
proclaimed duties and other import restrictions shall be in effect from and after such
time as is specified in the proclamation. The President may at any time terminate any
such proclamation in whole or in part." (Emphasis added.)
In 1962 the provisions of the 1934 amendment which stated the exception to the mostfavored nation principle were replaced by the new languge of section 251 of the Trade
Expansion Act. This necessitated the repeal of the language of section 350(a)(2) of the
Tariff Act, ". . the proclaimed duties and other import restrictions shall be in effect
from and after such time as is specified in the proclamation," which was accomplished
by section 257(b) of the Trade Expansion Act. The termination clause was left stranded
and unintelligible because it referred to "any such proclamation"-the one raising rates
which had been repealed. The codifiers then changed the language to read, "The President may at any time terminate, in whole or in part, any proclamation made pursuant
to this section." (Emphasis added.) This formulation was intended not to make any substantive change but rather only to clarify that when rates are raised by proclamation
the prior trade agreement proclamation must be terminated in part. The only reason for
believing that the section confers independent power is a highly superficial one-its
printed distance from the substantive provisions controlling the President's discretion.
239 For an example of a series of proclamations, see those affecting sheet glass. Pres.
Proclamation No. 3140, 3 C.F.RL § 74 (1956) (modifying existing duties where required or
appropriate to carry out United States trade agreements, by authority of section 350 of
the Tariff Act); Pres. Proclamation No. 3455, 3 C.F.R. § 166 (1962) (increasing rates, by
authority of section 350(a) of the Tariff Act and section 7(c) of the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1951); Pres. Proclamation No. 3458, 3 C.F.R. § 171 (1962) (modifying
Pres. Proclamation No. 3455 by postponing its effective date, by authority of the sections
cited in No. 3455 itself); Pres. Proclamation No. 3548, 3 C.F.R. § 298 (1963) (establishing
schedules, by authority of section 102 of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962); Pres.
Proclamation No. 3762, 3 C.F.R. § 20 (1967) (terminating Pres. Proclamation No. 5455
and Pres. Proclamation No. 3458 to the extent that it modified No. 3455 and decreasing the
increased rate effected by No. 3455, by authority of section 351(c)(l)(A) of the Trade
Expansion Act); Pres. Proclamation No. 3816, 3 C.F.R. § 90 (1967) (extending the remaining increased duties, by authority of section 351(c)(2) of the Trade Expansion Act); Pres.
Proclamation No. 3951, 3 C.F.RL § 86 (1969) (further extending the remaining increased
duties, by authority of section 351(c)(2) of the Trade Expansion Act); and Pres. Procla-
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The legislative history contains almost no direct discussion of either
section 255(b) or the parallel provision of section 350(a) of the Tariff
Act.24 0 However, no person in the Administration or Congress has
ever suggested that this provision confers any substantive power on
the President. In fact, when Sen. Eugene McCarthy of the Finance
Committee 241 compiled an inventory of powers given to the President
in the Trade Expansion Act "to safeguard genuine competition,"
section 255(b) was not among them.242 The position that a provision
conferring extensive power on the President would go undiscussed by
two Congresses carefully jealous of the surrender of legislative power
is untenable.
3. Executive Afterthoughts. The Proclamation did not rest solely
on statutory authority; it attempted to create additional justification
by announcing a national emergency. The Proclamation stresses the
"crisis" in its title, "Imposition of Supplemental Duty for Balance of
mation No. 3967, 3 C.F.R. § 28 (1970) (extending and modifying the rates, by authority
of sections 201(a)(2), 302(a)(2)-(3), and 351(a)(1) of the Trade Expansion Act).
In each of the proclamations affecting sheet glass duties, it should be noted, specific
substantive authority for the action being taken was cited. This is also true of all other
proclamations affecting duties prior to the proclamation of the surcharge, which relies
only generally on statutory authority "including, but not limited to, the Tariff Act of
1930, and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 ...." Pres. Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed.
Reg. 15,724 (1971). An additional step in the failure to premise presidential action on
specific substantive authority is suggested in the recent proclamation establishing a ceiling
on stainless steel flatware. Pres. Proclamation No. 4076, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,561 (1971). There
authority is claimed under section 350(a)(1)(B) of the Tariff Act, section 201(a)(2) of the
Trade Expansion Act, "and, as separate and additional authority," sections 350(a)(6) and
255(b) of those Acts, respectively (the termination provisions).
240 One of the few exceptions occurred in 1962 with respect to section 244(b) of the
Administration bill, H.R. 9900, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), which was in relevant part
identical to the present section 255(b). The context was an exchange of views between
Under Secretary Ball and Rep. Jackson E. Betts during hearings before the Ways and
Means Committee. Representative Betts asked, "To make sure I understand the mechanics, the agreement entered into, then that agreement is not effective until the proclamation. The proclamation follows the provisions of the agreement?" Undersecretary Ball
answered, "And of the Act." Betts continued, "And it will not in any case include an
increase in tariffs but after it has been in effect over a period of time and the President
finds there should be an increase, then under 244(b), he has the right, regardless of what
the provisions of the trade agreement are-," to which Ball replied, "He has the right, but
he is subject to the requirements of GATT which means that he must come in and discuss the possibilities of compensation under GATT." 1962 House Hearings, supra note
200, pt. 6, at 8871 (emphasis added). This exchange may be read as seeing in section
244(b) the "right" of the President to increase tariffs, but as Representative Betts noted
this right is operative only after the President "finds there should be an increase"-a
finding which must be made pursuant to the limitations of section 252. Id.
241 CONGMRSSIONAL DIRECTORY,

87th Cong., 2d Sess. 285 (1962).

108 CONG. Rc. 19,872 (1962). A similar omission occurred when Commerce Sec.
Luther Hodges made a compilation for the Senate Finance Committee, 1962 Senate Hearings, supra note 216, at 2280.
242

1971]

Responses to Foreign Trade Preferences

Payments Purposes," and begins with a recitaton of the "crisis":
"WHEREAS, there has been a prolonged decline in the international
monetary reserves of the United States, and our trade and international
competitive position is seriously threatened and, as a result, our continued ability to assure our security could be impaired .. . ."24 The
President later proclaims, "I hereby declare a national emergency
during which I call upon the public and private sector to make the
efforts necessary to strengthen the international economic position of
244
the United States."
a. Trading with the Enemy Act. No clarification of the possible
significance of this declaration was made by the President at the time
the surcharge was imposed. It later appeared, however, that the "national emergency" was intended to activate the authority that the
President possesses under section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy
Act,245 which in turn was intended to justify the surcharge. 246 Section
5(b) grants broad authority to the President, during war or presidentially declared national emergency, to regulate trade and financial transactions between Americans and foreign persons. Under this authority,
the President may "regulate . . . importation or exportation of...
any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has
any interest." 247
In deciding whether the above framework may be used as authority
for the surcharge, two questions must be answered: (1) did the President have the power to declare a "national emergency"? and, if so,
(2) does the Trading with the Enemy Act allow the imposition of the
surcharge?
Pres. Proclamation No. 4074, para. 1, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (1971).
Id. para. 6, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724.
245 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (1970). This section of the comment relies heavily on the thorough
study of Garson & Miller, The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: Constitutional
Questions and Operational Effects Examined, 11 B.C. IND. & COm. L. REV. 143 (1970).
246 See SENATE COIMa. ON FINANCE, Tim R vxNuu Acr OF 1971, S. REP. No. 92-437, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. 136 (1971); Wall Street Journal, Nov. 5, 1971, at 4, col. 2 (Midwest ed.).
247 Section 5(b) reads in part:
(1) During the time of war or during any other period of national emergency
declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by
means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange, trans.
fers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, and
the importing, exporting, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or
bullion, currency, or securities, and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition, holding, withholding,
.use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with
respect to, or transactions involving any property in which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest.
243

244
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i. National emergency. Although the power of the President to
declare national emergencies in time of war pursuant to his constitutional designation as Commander-in-Chief 24 8 seems well-established, 49
the constitutional status of emergencies declared in order to regulate
the peacetime economy is open to question. Prior to the Nixon Administration's balance-of-payments emergency, the only such economic
emergency ever declared was that proclaimed by President Roosevelt
in the heart of the Depression to announce a bank holiday. 50 Since
at that time section 5(b) powers were restricted to wartime situations,
the Administration rushed an amendment through Congress so that
2 51
the section could be activated by the national emergency declaration.
The Depression emergency was never challenged directly, probably
because the subsequent amendment of section 5(b) sufficed as a congressional delegation of power even though the President did not
possess the power originally. 252 The cases that do focus on the national
emergency power have dealt only with the types of regulation section
5(b) can support once an emergency is declared-i.e., have assumed
the emergency to be valid. Moreover, with one exception, they treat
only the legitimacy of economic regulation under wartime emergencies
25 3
or economic regulation in situations in which war is imminent.
The question of the import surcharge, an economic emergency measure for peacetime economic regulation, has been dealt with only in248 U.S. CoNsT. art. II,§ 2.
249 Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) initiates the line of cases. President

Truman declared a national emergency during the Korean War in Pres. Proclamation No.
2914, 3 C.F.R. § 99 (Comp. 1953), 50 U.S.C. App. notes preceding § 1 (1970). It provides:
[R]ecent events in Korea and elsewhere constitute a grave threat to the peace of the
world and imperil the efforts of this country and those of the United Nations to
prevent aggression and armed conflict ....[Wiorld conquest by communist imperialism is the goal of the forces of aggression that have been loosed upon the world. ..
The increasing menace of the forces of communist aggression requires that the
national defense of the United States be strengthened as speedily as possible ....
The Korean emergency has been legitimized in Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d
106 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966), and in Nielsen v. Secretary
of the Treasury, 424 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.).
250 Pres. Proclamation No. 2039, 31 C.F.R. § 120.1 (1933).
251 Garson & Miller, supra note 245, at 148-50 & n.35.
252 Id. at 148. See United States v. Biddle, 212 F. Supp. 584 (S.D. Cal. 1962), overruled,
Pike v. United States, 340 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1965). In Biddle the court stated in dictum,
-"Although this action [declaring the bank holiday] was cheerfully accepted, and even welcomed, at the time, it was clearly unauthorized, since nowhere in the Constitution is
the President given authority to act in an "emergency" as such, and the requisite war
conditions which might have called into play his granted power as Commander-in-Chief
or his delegated power under the Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917 did not obtain."
212 F. Supp. at 586.
258 The exception is Pike v. United States, 340 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1965). See note 260
infra.
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directly in a few Ninth Circuit cases, in which the issue was whether
peacetime economic regulation could stand on the authority of the
Depression emergency once the Depression had long passed. The Ninth
Circuit was asked in 1957 in Bauer v. United States254 to overturn a
conviction for the possession of gold bullion in violation of the Gold
Hoarding Regulations 2 51 issued under the authority of section 5(b).
The Regulations were challenged on the ground that the Depression
emergency no longer existed. Determination of this question logically
involves analysis of whether Congress, in using the term "emergency"
in section 5(b), meant to include a peacetime situation less drastic
than the Depression. 25 If not, the use of the Depression emergency in
the economic calm of the late 1950s would exceed the scope of delegated
power. The only other alternative would be to find that the power to
regulate the economy is the President's under the Constitution and
consequently does not require congressional delegation. This might
be done by linking up national emergencies with a loose definition
of the foreign affairs power,2 57 which is itself a loose definition of the
commander-in-chief

clause. 258

The Bauer court, however, merely

recognized the danger of vast economic regulatory power concentrated
in the President and remanded the case for a determination of the
continued existence of the Depression emergency. A later Ninth
Circuit case, Pike v. United States,2 59 also avoided the crucial questions
2 4
255

244 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1957).
Exec. Order No. 6260, 12 U.S.C. § 95a note (1970). This order, promulgated in con-

junction with the 1933 bank holiday, has been carried forward by Presidents Eisenhower
and Kennedy by authority of the Korean emergency. Exec. Order No. 10,896, 3 C.F.R.
§ 425 (Comp. 1963); Exec. Order No. 10,905, 3 C.F.R. § 436 (Comp. 1963); Exec. Order No.
11,037, 3 C.F.R. § 621 (Comp. 1963).
250 The legislative history indicates that they did not so intend. Carson & Miller, supra
note 245, at 149 n.35.

257 Presidential power in the conduct of foreign relations is not, of course, dependent
on congressional delegation but rather derives from the Constitution. United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). His power over foreign commerce, however, is not inherent and requires delegation. Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948). Whether a given exercise of power affecting foreign affairs
is inherent or requires delegation is not always dear. United States v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537 (1950), held that presidential power to exclude aliens is of the former origin.
The argument that the power to impose duties is within the President's inherent foreign
relations power cannot be made so easily, however, for at some point little is left of
congressional power. The fact that Congress has delegated some of its power increases the
area in which no inquiry as to origin need be made but makes inquiry more difficult in
the absence of delegation. See generally Bassiouni & Landau, PresidentialDiscretion in
Foreign Trade and its Effect on East-West Trade, 14 WAYNE L. Rav. 494, 495-505 (1968);
Fisher, Delegating Power to the President, 19 J. PUB. L. 251 (1970).
258 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
259 340 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1965).
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by deciding that the Gold Hoarding Regulations could be justified
under the Korean War emergency declared by President Truman
while noting that the Government conceded that the Depression
emergency no longer existed.
Although Pike and other cases 210 suggest that peacetime economic
regulation based on the Korean emergency may succeed even if the
Depression emergency is not extended, the Nixon Administration did
not attempt to justify the surcharge on this basis but instead declared
a new national emergency. Perhaps this is explained by a reticence to
stretch the purported scope of the Korean emergency too far.261 The
consequence, however, is that the Korean precedents can bear only indirectly on the newly declared emergency.
As a question of policy, it seems that Congress should not be viewed,
by its inclusion of emergency authority in Section 5(b), as authorizing
the President to engage in total regulation of the economy by mere incantation of the word "emergency." A better view is that the term
encompasses only severe domestic crises such as the Depression. In
less drastic situations the President should be required to go to Congress
for regulatory authority. As Professor Corwin points out, presidential
use of emergency power is justified in situations "which have not attained enough of stability or recurrency to admit of their being dealt
with according to rule."26 2 This may have been the case in the heart
260 Nielsen v. Secretary of the Treasury, 424 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.),

and Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 898 (1966), both upheld the Cuban Assets Control Regulations on the authority
of the Korean emergency. Both courts felt required, however, to mention that the Cuban
situation was connected to the communist threat underlying the Korean emergency. 424
F.2d at 839; 361 F.2d at 109. If these cases imply a defense-related scope for regulations
resting on the authority of the Korean emergency, they may explain the Nixon Administration's refusal to use that emergency as support for the surcharge. If Pike goes further,
by stating that the Trading with the Enemy Act may support any proclamation or regulation whether during peace or war-with the consequence that the surcharge could stand
on the authority of its own declared emergency, or perhaps the Korean emergency-then
it should not be followed. Rather, it should be limited to its facts. The Gold Hoarding
Regulations in Pike had been issued in 1933, and the court was naturally reluctant to
overturn regulations which had been in effect for more than thirty years. The surcharge,
on the other hand, involves an extension as opposed to a continuance of regulations. No
court has yet approved such an extension in peacetime and in the absence of a serious
emergency.
261 Garson & Miller, supra note 245, at 159. There is old authority that review of the
scope of an emergency is proper. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924) (Holmes,
J.). Of course, the loose language of the surcharge proclamation would not preclude
ultimate reliance on the Korean emergency.
262 E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 3 (4th ed. 1957). As Professor Corwin points out, the
Presidency is the branch of government most responsive to emergency conditions, which
he defines as those situations which do not recur.
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of the Depression, but it is not so when the United States balance of
payments is in deficit, a situation which has existed in every year but
two since 1950.263 More important, the President's ability to declare
national emergencies and to acquire broad power must be limited if we
are to avoid the concentration of executive power feared by the framers
of the Constitution. 264 If the courts are unwilling to review these decisions and Congress takes no active steps to reverse the trend, 26 5 each
must bear responsibility for the results.
ii. Imposition of the surcharge. The second question posed by the
national emergency rationale is whether, assuming the emergency is
valid, the Trading with the Enemy Act allows the imposition of the
surcharge.
The surcharge, while it might be supported by the broad power to
regulate importation and exportation of the property of foreign nationals and countries, is the only tariff measure ever used under the Act.
While the section has successfully supported foreign assets control regulations2 66 prohibiting unlicensed commercial transactions of any kind
with such countries as China, North Korea, North Vietnam, 26 7 and

Cuba;2 68 trade embargoes against belligerents; 69 and the Gold Hoarding Regulations,2 70 it has never been used, with court approval, against
all countries in the fashion of the surcharge.
The closest approximation to such use is the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations2 71 (FDIRs), issued by President Johnson in 1968,
which restrict the amounts of capital that American investors may
transfer to or accumulate in foreign affiliates and compel repatriation
of short-term liquid balances such as foreign bank deposits. Their
validity has yet to be tested in the courts.272 Like the surcharge, they
constitute a peacetime regulation of foreign economic commerce addressed to the balance-of-payments problem. Unlike the surcharge,
they are justified under the Korean emergency and involve an area void
of other legislation such as the Tariff and Trade Expansion Acts. The
263 SENATE Comm. oN FiNANCE, supra note 246, at 134 (on a liquidity basis).
264 TaE FEDmuALTST Nos. 48-49 (J. Madison).
265 See Kurland, The Reticence of Impotence, 1968 DuKE L.J. 619.
266 Nielsen v. Secretary of the Treasury, 424 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal,

J.).

267 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1971).
268 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1971).
269 Egyptian Assets Control Regulations, 21 Fed. Reg. 5777 (1956), as amended, 21 Fed.
Reg. 5861-62 (1956) (repealed 1958) (response to Suez crisis).
270 12 U.S.C. § 95a note (1970); see Pike v. United States, 340 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1965).
271 15 C.FR. §§ 1000.101-.1405 (1971), 12 U.S.C. § 95a note (1970).
272 Cf. 42 OP, ATr'Y GEN. 35 (1968) (Ramsey Clark to Commerce See. C.R. Smith).
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latter difference is critical in interpreting the scope of power authorized
in section 5(b).
The main argument against legitimating the surcharge under section
5(b) is that it would render meaningless the limits placed on presidential discretion under the Tariff and Trade Expansion Acts. This
argument should prevail even if it is contended that the Acts operate
in normal times while the Trading with the Enemy Act operates in
emergencies.
This view follows from two considerations. First, the Tariff and
Trade Expansion Acts were not passed in times more significantly normal than that covered by the surcharge. In fact, the Tariff Act amendment was passed in the heart of the Depression. 273 The same administration which declared the bank holiday still thought it necessary to
come to Congress when it needed authority to act in the tariff field.
Similarly, the Trade Expansion Act was a response to trade and balanceof-payments difficulties, as is clear in President Kennedy's message re274
questing the legislation.
Second, Congress authorized the President in both Acts to respond
to so-called emergencies by selectively retaliating against those who
substantially burdened United States trade. This consideration cannot be dismissed by a claim that the acts are addressed to import restrictions whereas the surcharge goes to the balance-of-payments problem.
As recognized by President Kennedy, the two are integrally related since
foreign import restrictions both decrease exports and lead to a trade
imbalance. 275 Retaliation against such restrictions is one means of
redressing that imbalance. Thus, Congress has spoken on the question
of the trade segment of the balance-of-payments problem but not the
capital flow segment, to which the FDIRs are addressed. Within this
context, one may view the President's declaration of a national
emergency as dissatisfaction with the policy embedded in the Tariff
and Trade Expansion Acts and an attempt to pursue new policies
despite the legislative judgment of past Congresses.
A final argument against legitimizing the surcharge under section
5(b) is that it is anomalous to include allies within the scope of the
Trading with the Enemy Act. Although the property of nations not
at war with the United States, as in the case of Cuba and Egypt, has
273 The Administration viewed the bill as an emergency provision. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 203, at 5-6 (statement of Secretary Hull). See also id. at 79-80 (statement
of Representative McCormack).
274 H.R. Doc. 314, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962). There were, of course, other enumerated reasons for the legislation as well.
275 Id. at 4.
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been regulated under the Act,2 76 it is a big step to "regulate" the prop-

erty of all countries, including Latin America and NATO allies. Even
South Vietnamese imports were subject to the surcharge. 77 Again, this
is unlike the FDIRs, which essentially regulate only American property
to reduce capital outflows.
b. Revenue Act of 1971. The Nixon Administration evidently
recognized the scarcity of authority for the surcharge under both the
Tariff and Trade Expansion Acts and the Trading with the Enemy
278
Act. Indeed, it "acquiesced" to proposed new legislation.
The problem in obtaining new legislation was the political cost of
admitting that the surcharge was an unauthorized action. This problem
276 Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-.809 (Supp. 1969); Egyptian
Assets Control Regulations, 21 Fed. Reg. 5777 (1956), as amended, 21 Fed. Reg. 5861 (1956)
(repealed 1958) (response to Suez crisis).
277 Thus, Senate Finance Committee sources have reportedly stated that it would "obviously be an unseemly thing to apply to friendly countries." Wall Street Journal, Nov. 5,
1971, at 4, col. 2 (Midwest ed.). According to the Senate Report, "The Committee felt
that the President should not have to resort to the 'Trading with the Enemy Act' when
dealing with the balance of payments emergency, particularly with respect to our friendly
trading partners." SENATE CoasM. oN FiNANCE, supra note 246, at 136.
278 H.R. 10947, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 601-05 (1971). It is not clear that it was at the
Administration's request that this legislation was introduced. New authority to impose
tariff quotas and to raise certain statutory rates had been suggested by Senator Fanin as
protection for industry, particularly automobile companies. NEP Hearings, supra note 125,
at 35-36. See also Hearings on H.R. 10947 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 122-23 (1971) (testimony of Arthur E. Summerfield, Sr., Chairman of the
Board, Summerfield Chevrolet Co.) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate Hearings]. There is
some indication, moreover, that certain senators would not have been content with
amendment of the statutory rates on particular items such as automobiles because interests in their own states might feel left out. There was, therefore, some pressure of a
protectionist variety for an across-the-board increase. See id. at 581 (statement of Sen.
Russell Long, Chairman of the Finance Committee).
The Administration's public position toward the new legislation took some curious
turns. When Secretary Connally testified before the Senate subcommittee reviewing the
President's initiatives in October, he stated, "I would hope the President could have more
authority in this field." NEP Hearings, supra note 125, at 113. After "additional" authority
was granted by way of an amendment to the Revenue Act of 1971 inserted in the executive session of the Senate Finance Committee, Press Sec. Ronald Ziegler stated that
"[t]he President did not request this authority and would not expect to use such powers."
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1971 at 67, col. 4 (city ed.). See also 117 CONG. REc. S18,735 (daily
ed. Nov. 16, 1971). After such opponents of "additional" authority as Senator Javits pressed
for rejection of the amendment since it was not desired by the Administration, however,
Asst. Treasury Sec. John S. Nolan sent Senator Long a letter stating that there were no
possible adverse consequences of granting such authority and that "[u]nder these conditions, the Administration does not seek their elimination from the bill." 117 CONG. REC.
S18,747 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1971). This letter was used by proponents of "additional" authority during the Senate debate on the measure. Id. at S18,741. The Administration's
reluctance to appear to be asking for authority which it already claimed to have and its
consequent posture of acquiescence are consistent with the conclusion that authority to
impose the surcharge was originally lacking.
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was sidestepped by assigning the need to two other reasons: unwillingness to be forced to rely on the Trading with the Enemy Act and limitations on the freedom to adopt new measures beyond the ten percent
surcharge under the Tariff and -Trade Expansion Acts.
These reasons are not particularly persuasive. First, both assume
that authority for the surcharge existed-an assumption which the
Administration successfully persuaded the Ninety-second Congress to
share without serious questioning despite its tenuous validity. Second,
there was no need to apply the Trading with the Enemy Act to other
countries insofar as the Administration claimed adequate authority
under the Tariff and Trade Expansion Acts.27 9 Third, certain limitations on presidential action asserted to exist under the latter Acts are
nonexistent. The claim that new authority was needed to terminate the
increased tariffs "selectively with respect to individual articles, groups
of articles or countries" is belied by the fact that under these Acts the
28 0
President can reinstate trade agreement concessions at any time.
Two claimed limitations of the Tariff and Trade Expansion Acts
were legitimate: the inability to raise rates beyond the statutory limits
set by Congress 281 and the inability to impose quotas.2 8 2 However, the
first problem, which is potentially serious in regard to only a few items
of trade, could be solved by an amendment of statutory rates. The
279 Moreover, as Senator Javits pointed out quite forcefully during the Senate debate,
the Trading with the Enemy Act had been applied to United States allies on a daily basis
since 1969 under the FDIRs. 117 CONG. REc. S18,745 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1971); see text at
note 241 supra.

280 In fact, the Administration argued that section 201 of the Trade Expansion Act
gave it this power. See NEP Hearings,supra note 125, at 24. Pres. Proclamation No. 4074,
36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (1971), also assumes this authority in its delegation of power to the
Secretary of the Treasury. See also H.R. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1962).
281 The statutory rates appear in column two of Tariff Schedules of the United States,
19 US.C. § 1202 (1970). (In some cases the column two rate may reflect previous tariff
increases. See 19 U.S.C. App. § 1202 (1970).) Increases may not exceed fifty percent of the
statutory rates existing on July 1, 1934. 19 U.S.C. § 1822 (1970). The selection of this date,
about one month after enactment of the Tariff Act amendment, insured that the statutory
rates would be substantially those of the Tariff Act since no trade concessions could yet
have been made under the newly passed amendment.
If the President had retaliated selectively, pursuant to section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act, he could have imposed a fifty percent surcharge where there had been no
prior increases. It was only because he sought to operate under section 255(b) that the
statutory rate limited the increase because all trade concessions which were withdrawn
had originated with the rate established by statute. Even under section 255(b), moreover,
there was no magic in the ten percent figure. If trade concessions had been more than
ten percent, they too could have been withdrawn under the logic of that provision. New
authority to go to fifteen percent was necessary only to operate under section 255(b),
which was improper, and if prior trade concessions had been less than fifteen percent.
282 This power was given by section 853 of the Trade Expansion Act, deleted by the
Conference Committee. See text and notes at notes 219-22 supra.
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second would require a simple amendment to section 252. Yet the
Administration's request was not so limited.
The Nixon Administration in effect followed the Roosevelt strategy
of 1933: declare a national emergency, take the desired policy action,
and then go to Congress for the necessary legislation. This strategy had
the advantage of solving the retroactivity problem if the new legislation
were keyed to the existence of a national emergency-which it was.
The only differences between 1971 and 1933 are that the bank holiday
was an extreme crisis whereas the balance-of-payments problem had
existed for several years and that President Roosevelt went openly and
immediately to Congress for authority whereas the Nixon Administration waited almost three months, acted in the interim without statutory
authority, and claimed while seeking authority that it was unnecessary.
The resulting proposed legislation was an amendment to the Revenue
Act of 197 1, 3 introduced in the executive session of the Senate Finance Committee after hearings on the Act had been concluded. 2 4 As
reported to the Senate, the amendment contained four principal features: (1) the substantive powers contained in the legislation were automatically in force during a "balance-of-payments emergency period,"
which included the period of the national emergency proclaimed by
the President for the imposition of the surcharge and any new periods
which he might proclaim until 1976;215 (2) during an emergency period,
the President might impose either quotas or a surcharge of up to fifteen
percent, but not both, on the products of any country unless a product
were subject to no duty under United States Tariff Schedules; 28 6 (3)
any foreign country might be exempted from the application of the
surcharge; 28 7 and (4) the President might proclaim a new balance-ofpayments emergency period only if he determined that
(1) the balance of payments (as measured by either the official
reserve transactions basis or the balance on current account and
long term capital) has been in deficit for four consecutive calendar
quarters,
(2) the United States has suffered a serious decline in its international monetary reserves, and
(3) there is a serious threat to the international financial position
288
of the United States.
283 H.R. 10947, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
284 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 5, 1971, at 4, col. 2 (Midwest ed.).
285 H.R. 10947, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 602 (1971).

286 Id. § 603.
287 Id. § 603(c).
288 Id. § 602(b)(1)-(3).
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Two points may be made about the provisions. First, if the President
left in force the old national emergency proclamation, he would not
even have to take into account the totally discretionary limitations in
imposing a new surcharge. Second, this amendment made the prior
Tariff and Trade Expansion Acts, insofar as they concern the power
of the President to raise tariff rates, irrelevant during a national
emergency period since the President could do everything under the
amendment which he could do under the Acts, and more. Thus, he
could either selectively or massively retaliate without limitations on his
discretion. The removal of such limitations would have been the
equivalent of congressional surrender of power in an area in which,
as recently as 1934, it was hotly debated whether Congress could delegate any power to the President.
When the Revenue Act reached the floor of the Senate, Sen.
Alan Cranston offered an amendment to delete the entire balanceof-payments provision, 29 characterizing it as "an economic Tonkin
Gulf Resolution." 290 During debate, the inevitable question was raised:
If the President had authority to impose the ten percent surcharge, why
did he need new authority for a fifteen percent one? Supporters of the
emergency provision first repeated the argument in the Senate Report
that reliance on the Trading with the Enemy Act seemed inappropriate to regulate trade with allies. 291 Sen. Wallace F. Bennett went
somewhat further, almost revealing that there might not be authority
for the surcharge as it stood. He stated that the President had been
forced to rely on "completely unrelated laws" and that the Senate
"should give the President specific legal authority for the future and
not leave him dependent on two acts [Trading with the Enemy and
the Tariff and Trade Expansion Acts] that were not intended for
balance-of-payments purposes." He did not want existing statutes to
be "twisted.1 292 The supporters of the Cranston amendment, which

failed on a 29-53 vote,29 3 did not ask how "twisted" and "not intended" statutes could serve as legal justification for the surcharge
since their objective was limited to opposing any new authority on
294
the matter.
289 117 CONG. REc. S18,733 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1971). This amendment was cosponsored
by Sen. William J. Fulbright, Sen. Mark 0. Hatfield, and Sen. Charles H. Percy.
290 Id. He added, "Trade deficits do not strike without warning like intercontinental
missiles, or surreptitiously, like torpedo boats in the night." Id. at $18,734.
291 Senator Long and Sen. Wallace F. Bennett of the Finance Committee made this
argument. Id. at S18,737, S18,739.
292 Id. at S18,739, S18,743.
293 Id. at S18,752.
294 Thus, Senator Cranston seemed concerned that the President would be given too
much power, id. at S18,737-38, Senator Fulbright that reducing the balance-of-payments
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With a few minor amendents, 95 the balance-of-payments provision
passed the Senate and was sent to the Conference Committee as part of
the Revenue Act. The Chairman of the Conference Committee was
Rep. Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee.
Ironically, Representative Mills was the only public official on record
directly questioning the existing legal authority for the surcharge. On
November 16, 1971 he had indicated that the surcharge had been
imposed without "appropriate consultation with and delegation of
authority from Congress." 296 Necessarily realizing, therefore, that deletion of the Senate amendment would continue the absence of authority,
the conferees nevertheless deleted it, explaining that "[t]his amendment was not considered on its merits because of questions as to its
germaneness under the House rules." 297 This meant that the House
did not consider the subject matter of the balance-of-payments provision related to the tax matters contained in the bill. Not questioning
the merits of the amendment also had the political advantage of
avoiding criticism by protectionists of the action taken by the conferees.
Executive afterthoughts have, therefore, not produced results. They
do, however, strongly reinforce the argument that the surcharge was
imposed without legal authority. Only time and a possible court test
will determine the consequences of such action-whether it will produce rebates for importers and consumers or be the occasion for
legitimizing even further extensions of presidential power.
It is clear, however, that an administration can convince a Congress
of its authority by twisting statutes. While it may be a relatively simple
task to persuade protectionists and members who generally defer to
deficit would reduce incentives to cut back expenditures in Vietnam, id., and Senators
Javits and Hatfield that the world would be alerted to United States willingness to engage in long-term economic warfare, id. at S18,734, S18,745.
205 Senator Fulbright, for example, won Senate approval of an amendment which would
have limited the grant of authority through 1973 instead of the 1976 date reported by the
Senate Finance Committee. Id. at S18,752-53.
206 N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1971, at 65, col. 5 (city ed.). In addition to the indirect assertion of this position by Senator Bennett, a few other legislators have made similar views
known. A faint hint was offered by Rep. Carl Albert, the House Speaker. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 16, 1971, at 65, col. 4 (city ed.). A more direct position was taken by Sen. Norris
Cotton when he offered and won Senate approval of a measure, deleted by the Conference
Committee, which would have granted the President broad authority to impose quotas.
Senator Cotton stated that he felt that reliance on the Trading with the Enemy and
Tariff Acts was placed "arbitrarily" and that the President "might or might not be sustained by the courts in that." 117 CONG. REc. S19,230 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1971).
207 H.R. RE. No. 708, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1971). The report was approved by both
houses and sent to the President for signature. Members of the Senate questioned the
germaneness rulings but did not comment directly on the deletion of the balance-of-payments provision. 117 CoN. Rnc. S21,095-109 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1971).
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presidential power whatever the statutory context, the silence of
those members who seek to protect congressional power is most distressing. If Senator Cranston was correct in calling the balance of payments provision a new Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, it is remarkable
that this time the Resolution did not become law, and yet the President pursued his policy unchallenged. 298
Although in examining the surcharge it has been argued that the
policy result of an extension of presidential power was unsatisfactory
since the lawful policy of selective retaliation would have been preferable, surely the success or failure of the policy is not the only consideration. Even if the surcharge had succeeded in dismantling the
preference system, the immeasurable cost of further disruption of the
constitutional allocation of powers must be weighed in the balance.
The remarkable aspect of this examination of surcharge authority
is the finding that congressional power may be eroded even where Congress has asserted its authority. Thus, despite the continuous policy
judgments of Congress embedded in the tariff legislation and its refusal to validate retroactively a departure from those judgments, the
President may still succeed in implementing his own policy views.
If the courts abstain from preserving congressional power in a proper
case, one wonders what more can be asked of Congress. Has the
vigilant exercise of its tax power through legislation been futile, and
is the burden now on Congress to reassert its authority once more?
Even if it did so, one suspects that in the next "crisis" the President
would not act much differently and that the assertion would always be
one crisis too late.
CONCLUSION

In its attempt to obtain fundamental change in the EEC preference
system, the United States has pursued a variety of policies without
any significant success. Legal argumentation at the GATT has been
listened to by the EEC and has even induced reply but has done
little more than to focus attention on the problem. Not only is the
EEC unlikely to change policies because of the persuasiveness of United
States ideas, but the other member nations of GATT, as they become
more involved in the EEC preference system, will probably also have
little interest in supporting the United States position.
298 Of interest for the future is the fact that Pres. Proclamation 4098, 36 Fed. Reg.
24,201 (1971), which effected removal of the surcharge, did not terminate the "national
emergency" proclaimed when the surcharge was declared. This may indicate that future
legislation declaring the surcharge retroactively valid is a possibility. Moreover, it leaves
in effect presidential access to the broad powers of the Trading with the Enemy Act.
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The United States strategy of competition, through offering its own
alternative preference system to less-developed countries, has foundered
essentially because of the relative unattractiveness of the United States
market. Moreover, the potential of offering this market is offset by
the protectionist forces in Congress and the Administration. Although
the United States may eventually formulate a general preference plan,
it would be surprising if less-developed countries withdrew from their
trading relations with the EEC in order to participate in it.
The retaliatory policy of the surcharge did not produce trade concessions since there were other items-particularly monetary realignment-on which the United States placed higher priority. Moreover,
its imposition demonstrated that the resistance of the EEC to retaliation is likely to be as great as that of France, its most resistant member. Finally, to the extent that the United States views the EEC in
positive terms as related to its defense posture in Western Europe, it
must stop short of imposing measures which place serious strains on
EEC unity.
In the future, one course seems open-a new round of trade talks
between the United States and the EEC in which reciprocal concessions
are given. Two critical obstacles in the path of such an initiative may be
predicted. First, such talks will by nature require United States concessions in return for alteration of the preference system, and these
may be resisted by a protectionist Congress. Second, it is possible that
major changes in the preference system are nonnegotiable, at least at
the price the United States may be willing to pay. This possibility
arises from the fact that the preference system is coordinate with the
attempt of the EEC to exert influence in international affairs.
The important by-product of the surcharge was further erosion of
congressional power, particularly of a power which is constitutionally
and institutionaly most precious-the tax power. Congress had decided
that retaliation should be on a selective basis, but the President ignored
the legal status of this judgment. It is to be expected that this unchecked exercise of presidential power will be used as a precedent
for still further extension in the future.
From a historical perspective, the long struggle of the United States
against preferences is part of the adjustment process between the
United States and Western Europe in defining relative world influence.
As conflict sharpens, multilateral trade principles such as the mostfavored nation principle are being replaced by more regional and discriminatory rules, characterized by preferences.
Hal S. Scott

